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Section 337 of the-Tariff Act of 19301 has become a controversial
tool for enforcement of United States intellectual property rights. This is
particularly true after its amendment by the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988 (Omnibus Act).2 Generally, section 337 pro-
vides an administrative mechanism for relief from unfair import
practices. Specifically, owners of registered U.S. intellectual property
rights may seek to block infringing imports through exclusionary reme-
dies from the International Trade Commission (ITC).3 The U.S. Cus-
toms Service will enforce the Commission's order at the border.4 The
recent Omnibus Act amendments to section 337 have substantially eased
the claimant's burden when the basis of the claim is an intellectual prop-
erty right. The Omnibus Act eliminated most of the standing require-
ments of the old section 337, strengthened some of the remedies, and
added a number of procedures. 5
Commentators have criticized the Omnibus Act amendments on the
grounds of overbreadth 6 and on the basis that it is inconsistent with U.S.
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).7 Specifically, a 1988 GATT panel found that section 337 dis-
criminates against foreign producers and manufacturers.8 The U.S.
1. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 703 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1988)). Section 337 was amended by the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
§ 341(a), 88 Stat. 1978, 2053 (1975), to protect domestic industries further by providing due
process hearings under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706
(1988), and by allowing equitable defenses to respondents. Terry L. Clark, The Future of
Patent-Based Investigations Under Section 337 After the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 1149, 1154 (1989).
2. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1342, 102 Stat. 1107, 1212-16 (1988). The Omnibus Act was
intended to be "the most comprehensive restructuring of basic U.S. trade policy since the
Trade Act of 1974," and its provisions affect most of the basic U.S. trade laws. H.R. REP. No.
40, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 HousE, REPORT]. The Act
addresses: the balance of foreign trade, foreign trade barriers, trade policymaking, and in-
creased U.S. competitiveness worldwide. MeL at 2-3. For a brief history of section 337, see
Clark, supra note 1.
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(f) (1988). For convenience and clarity, this Note primarily will
discuss patent rights rather than the other registered intellectual property rights covered by
§ 337: trademarks, copyrights, and mask works.
4. Id § 1337(d)-(e).
5. See infra notes 83-84, 130-35 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
7. The GATT is a broad multilateral trade agreement which promotes policies of non-
discrimination and fair competition among member countries. General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. For a discussion
of relevant U.S. obligations under GATT, see infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
8. United States Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, GATT Doc. 46439 (Nov. 7, 1989),
compiled in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARiFFS AND TRADE, BASIc INSTRUMENTS AND SE-
LECTED DOCUMENTS 345, 396 (36th Supp. 1990) [hereinafter 1988 GATT Panel Report].
The U.S. resisted adopting the panel report until November 1989. Gatt CouncilAdopts Dispute
Panel Reports on U.S. Section 337 Korean Beef Quotas, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at
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Trade Representative9 has responded to this finding with a set of propos-
als that would amend section 337 to conform it with the GATT. 10 Sec-
tion 337 is seen as politically essential,11 however, and there have been
several legislative proposals that recommend strengthening it to maintain
its protective character.12
This Note outlines criticisms of the new section 337 made by com-
mentators and the 1988 GATT Panel Report. It discusses the need for
reform and the reform proposals suggested since 1988. It focuses on the
five new proposals offered by the U.S. Trade Representative in response
to the 1988 GATT Panel Report. Finally, it proposes that Congress
amend section 337 to allow transfer of section 337 cases to federal district
courts at the option of section 337 defendants. This solution preserves
the balance of conflicting policies present in section 337-pure intellec-
tual property protection and protection of domestic industry-while ad-
dressing GATT concerns.
I. Introduction
While U.S. trade laws generally offer several remedies for unfair im-
port practices, 13 section 337 specifically provides a remedy for the in-
fringement of intellectual property rights. Unfair import practices are
defined as the importation of goods that infringe statutory U.S. patents,
1466 (Nov. 15, 1989) [hereinafter Gatt Council Adopts]; see infra notes 183-184 and accompa-
nying text.
9. The U.S. Trade Representative is a presidential appointee responsible for some of the
trade policy decisions previously vested in the President. 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1988). The crea-
tion of this office is seen as one of Congress' attempts to curtail the President's authority. Fred
0. Boadu & E. Wesley F. Peterson, Enforcing United States Foreign Trade Legislation: Is
There a Need for Expanded Presidential Discretion?, 24 J. WORLD TRADE Aug. 1990, at 79,
81.
10. USTR Proposes Changes in U.S. Patent Enforcement System Under Section 337, 39
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 967, at 259-60 (Feb. 8, 1990) [hereinafter USTR
Proposes Changes].
11. See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text. Sen. John Heinz has referred to § 337
as "the centerpiece of U.S. intellectual property law." Gatt Council Adopts, supra note 8, at
1467. Another senator, John D. Rockefeller IV, favors increasing § 337's use as a bargaining
tool to force Japan and other countries to strengthen protection of U.S. patents. Bill Would
Amend § 337 to Address Inadequate Japanese Patent Protection, 38 Pat. Trademark & Copy-
right J. (BNA) No. 942, at 364 (Aug. 10, 1989).
12. See infra Section III.B.
13. See, eg., antidumping, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988) (imposing customs duties on a class
of foreign merchandise that is sold in the U.S. at less than its fair value; the duties roughly are
equivalent to the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the U.S. price for the
goods); countervailing duties, Id. § 1671 (imposing customs duties to compensate for subsidies
provided for merchandise imported into the U.S.); predatory imports, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (an
import "escape clause" allowing a claimant to request duties or restrictions on fairly traded
imports whose importation threatens a U.S. industry).
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trademarks, or copyrights. 14 Section 337 provides sweeping remedies
against unlawful import practices, including the total exclusion of, and in
some cases the forfeiture of, the infringing imported goods. The ITC is
limited by two requirements in fashioning its remedies: (1) the ITC must
balance the benefits of any relief to the intellectual property owner
against the adverse impact on the public health and welfare, on competi-
tive conditions in the U.S. economy, on production of similar or directly
competitive articles in the United States, and on U.S. consumers; 15 and
(2) the ITC must refer all section 337 orders to the President, who may
modify or negate the orders for "policy reasons."1 6 Section 337 primar-
ily is designed to provide complainants efficient and expeditious relief.
The statutory time limits upon a complaint's resolution1 7 make section
337 actions attractive to U.S. intellectual property owners because the
alternative federal district court action could take much longer to re-
solve.18 The time limits also give a complainant an important strategic
advantage because, although a complainant has time to prepare her case
fully before she files her complaint, the respondent has virtually no time
in which to prepare a defense.
Section 337's administrative remedies are available in addition to
federal statutory remedies provided by patent, trademark, and copyright
infringement law.19 In an infringement action involving imported goods,
therefore, a U.S. intellectual property holder has a choice of fora in
which to proceed against the respondent importer or manufacturer. 20
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)-(D) (1988).
15. Id. § 1337(c)-(g).
16. Id. § 1337(j). "What exactly constitutes 'policy reasons' is not known and the only
two cases that have discussed the issue of Presidential discretion under Section 337 have both
concluded that the President's disapprovals of affirmative ITC findings are not subject to judi-
cial review." Boadu & Peterson, supra note 9, at 81.
17. Id. § 1337(b). The time limit for concluding an investigation is 12 months or 18
months in more complex cases.
18. The U.S. Trade Representative has estimated that the median time for disposition of
patent cases in federal district court is 31 months-longer than for any other type of civil
action. See infra note 286.
19. Clark, supra note 1, at 1155.
20. Until 1988, however, a holder of a U.S. process patent had no recourse to the federal
courts. The holder could rely only on § 337 because importation of a patented product made
abroad was not considered "infringement" of the process patent. Sutton v. Gulf Smokeless
Coal Co., 77 F.2d 439, 441 (4th Cir. 1935); Akzona Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
662 F. Supp. 603, 615 (D. Del. 1987). Therefore, no use of the patented process in a foreign
country could constitute infringement in the United States. Bruce Kramer, Comment, Protect-
ing the High-Tech Frontier: The Need for Stronger Process Patent Laws, 21 AKRON L. REv.
429, 431 (1988). Since 1940, the importation of products produced by a patented process has
been considered an "unfair act" for § 337 purposes. Clark, supra note 1, at 1157. Thus, a U.S.
process patent holder could pursue § 337 remedies if she meets the statute's other require-
ments. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. As a result of the Omnibus Act, how-
ever, the patent laws now specifically define importation of a product made by a patented
process as an act of patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1988).
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Because of this choice of fora, section 337 complainants traditionally
have been required to show that the economic circumstances resulting
from the infringement justified section 337's special remedies.21 For ex-
ample, prior to 1988, a section 337 complainant was required to show
that the unfair import practice had an injurious effect on an efficient do-
mestic industry.22 This injury to industry requirement ensured that sec-
tion 337's administrative remedies would only be used to enforce
intellectual property rights that could not be enforced as easily in the
federal district courts.23
Largely in response to the growing trade deficit and accompanying
political pressures to protect U.S. companies,24 Congress amended sec-
tion 337 to ease access to the administrative forum and to increase the
proceeding's efficiency. Prior to 1988, section 337 was limited by the
need for a claimant to prove "[an] effect or tendency ... to destroy or
substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in
the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry. ' 25
Congress essentially eliminated this injury to industry requirement where
the basis of a claim is the infringement of a registered intellectual prop-
erty right.26 In its place, Congress required that "an industry in the
United States, relating to the articles protected by... [the intellectual
21. Clark, supra note 1, at 1155.
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982). The statutory language defined an efficient domestic in-
dustry as "an industry efficiently and economically operated, in the United States." Id The
ITC defined the term further in its case law and included the following factors in its analysis:
the use of modem, automated equipment; an extensive distribution network, substantial invest-
ment in the production of the subject articles; the use of computerized equipment; expendi-
tures on research and development personnel; extensive production facilities; laboratory and
testing facilities; efforts to expand production capacity and delivery time; consistent high profit
levels; efficient quality control; the use of modern accounting techniques; an increase in pro-
ductivity; and success in the marketplace. Harvey Kaye & Paul Plaia, Jr., Unfair Trade Prac-
tices in International Trade Competition: A Review of Developments Under Section 337 64 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 360, 370 (1982).
23. See infra note 78, 108-10 and accompanying text.
24. 1987 House REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3. The trade deficit has been attributed to a
serious decline in U.S. competitiveness-the real target of the § 337 reforms. See id. at 2-7;
Clark, supra note 1. Moreover, the trade reform contained in the Omnibus Act also is seen as
the manifestation of congressional frustration with the executive branch's leadership in trade
policy. The executive branch traditionally has favored liberalization of trade. I.M. Destler,
United States Policymaking in the Uruguay Round, reprinted in DOMESTIC TRADE POLITICS
AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 191-207 (Henry R. Nau ed., 1989). A full discussion of the
reform efforts that were designed to shore up U.S. industry and labor is beyond the scope of
this Note.
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982). See supra note 22. The definition of what is substantial
injury to a domestic industry is discussed infra at note 78.
26. The injury to industry requirement essentially remains intact for claims that are not
based on intellectual property right infringement. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (1988). The only
major change for a complainant asserting those claims is that such a complainant need not
prove the U.S. industry is efficiently and economically operated.
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property right] concerned, exists or is in the process of being estab-
lished." 27 In addition, Congress intended the definition of domestic in-
dustry to be construed more broadly than it had been by the ITC and to
require minimal activity in the United States by the intellectual property
owner.
28
Easing the standing requirements was designed to increase the in-
centive for U.S. companies to invest in research and development by en-
suring that the U.S. patent or trademark would be protected against
infringing imports.29 Critics have charged, however, that the amend-
ments destroy section 337's protective purpose, because the broader do-
mestic industry definition under the new section 337 gives foreign owners
of U.S. intellectual property rights the same ease of access to the ITC.30
The amendments also subject domestic companies manufacturing abroad
to attack in the United States by foreign companies holding U.S. intellec-
tual property rights.31
Any reform of section 337 must strike a delicate balance between
two competing policies. The first policy is economic protectionism,
which suggests limiting section 337's administrative remedies to those
complainants who manufacture or produce in the United States.3 2 The
second policy is intellectual property protection, which urges equal treat-
ment of foreign and domestic companies holding U.S. intellectual prop-
erty rights, regardless of the level of manufacturing activity in the United
States.33 Reform that balances these interests should be made soon.
Given the current international attack on section 337 as discriminatory,
and the likelihood of retaliatory sanctions by the GATT members whose
own domestic companies suffer discrimination, it is essential that section
337 be amended to respond to the charges of unequal treatment.
Part II focuses on the current scope of section 337 in intellectual
property cases and the critical response to the 1988 Congressional
amendments. Part III presents and evaluates other proposals for reform
27. Id. § 1337(a)(2).
28. Clark, supra note 1, at 1152. The Ways and Means Committee was "concerned...
that... the [International Trade] Commission has interpreted the domestic industry require-
ment in an inconsistent and unduly narrow manner." 1987 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at
157.
29. 1987 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 156; see Clark, supra note 1, at 1150-52.
30. Clark, supra note 1, at 1153, 1187.
31. Ia at 1187. The expanded definition of domestic industry
does not preclude foreign owners from asserting their United States patent rights in
the ITC, despite never owning property or investing in the United States, so long as
they have substantial investment related to the exploitation of their patent rights in
research and development, licensing, or other related activities in the United States.
Id.
32. See id. at 1186-87.
33. See 1987 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 155-56. Congress has been unwilling to go
this far, however, and thus retained the domestic industry requirement. Id. at 156-57.
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suggested by commentators and legislators. Part IV critically analyzes
five reform proposals put forth by the U.S. Trade Representative in Feb-
ruary 1990 in response to the 1988 GATT Panel Report. It then recom-
mends an option of allowing a respondent to transfer section 337
proceedings to a federal district court. This option addresses the GATT
concerns over discrimination against foreign manufacturers by allowing
respondents the choice of a judicial forum. It also preserves the statute's
exclusionary remedies and does not alter the policy balance built into the
current section 337.
II. Section 337 Actions and GATT Conflicts
This Part discusses the current status of a section 337 action. Sec-
tions A, B, and C describe the nature of the action, the differences be-
tween a section 337 administrative proceeding and a federal district court
action, and the more problematic provisions of the new section 337. Sec-
tion D then outlines the findings of two recent GATT Panel Reports that
declare that section 337 violates GATT. Finally, Section E discusses the
possibility of any significant reform emerging from the current round of
GATT talks.
A. Jurisdiction of the ITC and the Elements of a Section 337 Action
This section outlines the elements of a section 337 proceeding when
the unfair import practice alleged is infringement of a U.S. intellectual
property right. Analysis of the procedures and comparison to district
court procedures appears in sections B and C. The International Trade
Commission (ITC) is an independent agency composed of six presiden-
tially appointed commisssioners. The agency had broad investigatory
and factfnding powers under the U.S. trade laws and assists the Presi-
dent and Congress in implementing trade policy.34
(1) Basic Procedure
Although a section 337 action may be initiated by the ITC itself, it is
usually initiated by the filing of a complaint. 35 In its statement of facts, a
complaint must allege the import, or sale after import, of an infringing
article and the existence of an industry in the United States relating to
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988). No more than three of the commissioners may be from
the same political party. Id. See 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988); Donald J. Suda, Comment, Com-
plainant Fraud on the International Trade Commission: Is there a Standard?, 35 CATH. U. L.
REv. 545, 545 (1986).
35. Investigations of Unfair Practices in Import Trade, 19 C.F.R. § 210.10 (1991); Ken-
neth E. Krosin & Holly D. Kozlowski, Patent Based Suits at the International Trade Commis-
sion Following the 1988,Amendments to Section 337, 17 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 47,
52 (1989).
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the protected article.36 Since 1988, the complaint need not allege injury
to a domestic industry. 37 The complainant may also file a request for
temporary relief in the form of a temporary exclusion order.38 Unlike a
preliminary injunction available in a district court, however, a temporary
exclusion order may be limited by the ITC's consideration of the order's
effect on the public health and welfare, of competitive conditions in the
U.S. economy, of production of similar or directly competitive articles,
and of U.S. consumers. 39
The ITC has thirty days to evaluate the complaint and decide
whether or not to institute an investigation. 4° If the ITC decides to in-
vestigate, it must publish a notice of investigation in the Federal Register
and serve the complaint and notice of investigation upon the named re-
spondents.41 The investigation is then referred to an Administrative Law
Judge (AIJ). Respondents have twenty days from the date of service, or
ten days if a request for temporary relief has been filed, to submit a writ-
ten response, which includes admissions or denials of the allegations in
the complaint and affirmative defenses.42 Counterclaims, however, are
not permitted. The response time allowed in this forum does not differ
significantly from that allowed in a district court.43
If a motion for temporary relief has been fied, the ALl has 90 days,
or 150 days in more complicated cases, to make a determination on the
request. The temporary relief petition must indicate the probability of
success on the merits, the immediate and substantial harm to the domes-
tic industry if temporary relief is denied, any harm to respondents if tem-
porary relief is granted, and the effect, if any, that temporary relief will
have on the public interest.44 The ALJ also may require a bond from the
complainant as a prerequisite to temporary relief, and the ITC's policy is
to require a bond in every case.45 Factors influencing whether a bond is
required, and how much should be required, include: the strength of the
complainant's case; whether a bond would impose undue hardship on the
complainant; whether the respondent has answered the petition for tem-
porary relief; the degree of harm to the respondent if temporary relief is
36. Krosin & Kozlowski, supra note 35, at 48, 52. This element is discussed infra at
notes 111-18. The complaint must also include copies of the allegedly infringed patent, trade-
mark, or copyright and a request for relief. 19 C.F.R. § 210.20.
37. See infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the injury to industry
requirement; infra section II.B. for a discussion of the implications of its removal.
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1988).
39. Id
40. 19 C.F.R. § 210.12.
41. Id § 210.12-210.13.
42. Id. § 210.21.
43. FED. R. CIv. P. 12.
44. Krosin & Kozlowski, supra note 35, at 54-55. The "public interest" is defined infra
note 95.
45. 19 C.F.R. § 210.24.
[Vol. 43
SECTION 337 AND THE GATT
granted; and "[a]ny other legal, equitable, or public interest considera-
tion that is relevant... (including the question of whether the complain-
ant is using the temporary relief proceedings . . . to harass the
respondents or for some other improper purpose). ' 46 ITC regulations
offer little guidance in determining the size of the bond. The regulations
merely state that it may range from ten to one hundred percent of the
sales revenues and licensing royalties from the domestic product at is-
sue.47 The bonds are intended to deter the abuse of temporary relief pro-
cedures, and are not awarded to successful parties. They may, however,
be forfeited to the U.S. Treasury.4 Unless the ITC vacates the AIJ's
determination on temporary relief, the initial decision becomes the ITC's
decision after twenty days, or thirty days in more complicated cases.
Discovery in a section 337 investigation is similar to discovery in the
federal district courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but
under substantially shorter time constraints. 49 ITC procedure also paral-
lels district court procedure for motions.50
Final determination of a section 337 violation must be completed
"at the earliest practicable time, but not later than one year," or eighteen
months in more complicated cases.51 From a complainant's point of
view, this is a section 337 action's primary advantage over a district court
action. The AUJ holds judicial-type evidentiary hearings52 and submits
an initial determination of violation and proposed permanent relief
within nine months, or fourteen months in more complicated cases.
These determinations are subject to the same public interest factors as
the petition for temporary relief.53 The available remedies include a per-
manent exclusion order which is enforceable at the border against any
person (a general exclusion order)54 or against named respondents (a lim-
ited exclusion order),5 s and a cease and desist order against any person,
enforceable by civil penalties obtainable in the district courts.5 6 Thus, an
ITC complainant need not establish personal jurisdiction over all import-
ers to obtain relief. Unlike federal district court patent litigation, section
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 210.58.
49. Krosin & Kozlowski, supra note 35, at 56; see FED R. Civ. P. 26-37.
50. Krosin & Kozlowski, supra note 35, at 59; see FED R. Civ. P. 7, 11.
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (1988).
52. 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.41-210.43.
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d). See supra text accompanying note 41.
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e). The ITC proceeds directly against the infringing articles. Once
the ITC finds that § 337 has been violated, it may direct the exclusion of the infringing articles,
regardless of who imports them. This rule also is applicable to temporary exclusion orders.
Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 1337(f).
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337 damages are not awarded to a successful complainant. The remedies
all are prospective in nature and include only exclusionary relief.
The ITC serves the ALJ's initial determination on the Department
of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, the Federal
Trade Commission, and other agencies the ITC considers appropriate,
and receives their comments.57 The AL's initial determination becomes
the ITC's determination forty-five days after service on the other agen-
cies, unless the ITC orders a review.58 If the ITC reviews the AL's
initial determination, the parties may submit briefs and present oral
argument.5 9
If the ITC's final determination is one of violation, it is sent to the
President for reviewA° The President then has 60 days to disapprove the
ITC's proposed order for policy reasons, or the order becomes final.61
The parties may file a petition for reconsideration with the ITC or appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit).62
(2) Jurisdiction and Res Judicata
Jurisdictional problems arise in section 337 actions because a U.S.
intellectual property holder may sue an infringer in the district courts
under the patent, trademark, and copyright laws, and an importer of in-
fringing articles in the ITC under section 337. Conflicts may arise when
one tribunal is asked to give preclusive effect to the decisions of the other,
or to exercise mandamus jurisdiction over the other.6 3
The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in patent and copy-
right matters and original jurisdiction in trademark mattersA4 The fed-
eral courts' jurisdiction is exclusive with respect to its "original
jurisdiction"-jurisdiction to take a cause of action at its inception-but
is not exclusive with respect to all patent or copyright related issues aris-
57. Id § 1337(b)(2); 19 C.F.R. § 210.53(e).
58. 19 C.F.R. § 210.53(h). The parties may also petition the ITC for a review of the
Al's initial determination. Id § 210.54.
59. Id. § 210.56.
60. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j). Presidential disapproval of the ITC determination is not appeal-
able. Presidential approvals and orders made final for lack of presidential action within the
statutory time limit, however, are appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
19 C.F.R. § 210.71.
61. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j). The President's policy review is considered infra at notes 142-
48 and accompanying text.
62. 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.60-210.71.
63. Michael A. Ritscher, et al., The Status of Dual Path Litigation in the ITC and the
Courts: Issues of Jurisdiction, Res Judicata, and Appellate Review, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.
ASS'N Q.J. 155, 165 (1990). Generally, both the ITC and the district courts have refused to
stay parallel proceedings in the other tribunal, but the ITC has stayed its own proceedings
pending the outcome of a district court case. Id. at 165-66. The district courts, however,
generally do not stay their own proceedings pending the outcome of an ITC proceeding. Id.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [V/ol. 43
ing under nonintellectual property laws. 65 The ITC has exclusive juris-
diction over matters of unfair importation of goods under section 337
because the patent, trademark, and copyright laws do not specifically bar
import of infringing articles. 66 This creates conflicting jurisdiction: ju-
risdiction over unfair acts in the importation of goods; and jurisdiction
over the validity and infringement of domestic intellectual property
rights. Prior to 1974, the ITC could not consider a defense of invalidity
in patent based cases, although it could consider a defense of noninfringe-
ment.67 In 1988, however, the Omnibus Act amendments made validity
of the intellectual property right a required element of a section 337
cause of action, and therefore part of the ITC's original jurisdiction.68
Therefore, a U.S. intellectual property holder may sue for infringement
in the district courts to obtain damages and injunctive relief, and she may
sue for the unfair practice of importing infringing articles in the ITC to
obtain nonmonetary exclusion and cease and desist orders. Both tribu-
nals consider the issues of the validity and enforceability of the intellec-
tual property right, but complete relief is unavailable in one forum.
The preclusive effect of ITC decisions appears to follow jurisdic-
tional lines. Legislative history of section 337 in 1974 indicates that
while the ITC must consider defenses of validity and enforceability of the
intellectual property right at issue, the ITC is not empowered to set aside
a patent as invalid or render it unenforceable. 69 The nonpreclusive effect
of ITC decisions on validity and enforcement matters springs from the
federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction over those matters. 70 Thus Con-
gress concluded:
The Commission's findings neither purport to be, nor can they be, re-
garded as binding interpretations of the U.S. patent laws in particular
factual contexts. Therefore, it seems clear than any disposition of a
Commission action by a Federal Court should not have a res judicata
or collateral estoppel effect in cases before such courts. 71
Some commentators question whether these restrictive statements still
apply after 1988, when validity and enforceability issues were added to
the ITC's original jurisdiction.72 It is clear, however, that the district
courts freely may grant preclusive effect to nonpatent matters and pat-
ent-related matters that do not include validity and enforceability. 73 In
65. Ritscher, et al., supra note 63, at 162.
66. Id. at 163.
67. Id. at 164.
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)-(D) (1988).
69. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7186, 7329 [hereinafter 1974 SENATE REPORT].
70. In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 721 F. Supp. 596, 601 (D. Del.
1987).
71. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 69, at 196, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7329.
72. Ritscher et al., supra note 63, at 167.
73. Id. at 169; Union Mfg. Co. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42, 45-46 (2d Cir.
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sum, while courts have indicated that federal court determinations may
be preclusive in the ITC, these issues have not been resolved.74
B. The Nature of Section 337 Actions
Section 337 generally proscribes "unfair methods of competition
and unfair acts in the importation of articles... into the United States"
(unfair import practices).75 Before 1988, the proscribed practices were
defined primarily in terms of their effect on the relevant U.S. industry.
Unfair import practices were those which had an "effect or tendency...
to destroy or substantially injure an [efficiently and economically oper-
ated domestic] industry,... or to prevent the establishment of such an
industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United
States."' 76 Traditionally, injury to industry included: lost sales, declining
domestic production, declining profits, loss of royalties, competition be-
tween the domestic product and the imported infringing product, and
increased import and sale of infringing goods. Such injuries caused the
domestic industry to lower its prices, reduce its employment, or lose po-
tential or actual sales.77 Thus, the unlawful act's definition was inextrica-
bly intertwined with the requirement that a petitioner prove injury to an
efficiently and economically operated domestic industry.78 The remedy,
therefore, was intended to protect domestic industry and labor.79
The new section 337 deals with claims based on intellectual property
rights separately from other claims. For claims not based on valid intel-
lectual property rights, 0 section 337 defines unfair import practices as
1985) (common law trademark); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.
Supp. 1369, 1401 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
74. Ritscher, et al., supra note 63, at 175.
75. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (1988). The old § 337 left these unfair import practices
largely undefined. They were, however, broadly interpreted by the ITC. David S. Nance,
Relieffrom Unfair Import Practices Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930: An Overview,
13 N.C. J. Ir'r'L L. & COM. REG. 493, 496 & n.12 (1988).
76. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982).
77. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1161.
78. One commentator summarizes this element of proof. He suggests that complainants
had to prove: substantial injury-generally through lost sales, lost profits, or decreases in
actual use of the company's total capacity; threat of substantial injury-generally that the
respondent had readied itself for overseas production, had increased imports, or had shown an
intenf to flood the U.S. market; or that the complainant effectively had been prevented from
establishing an industry because of changed market conditions resulting from the increased
competition. Andrew S. Newman, The Amendments to Section 337: Increased Protection for
Intellectual Property Rights, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 571, 576 & nn. 27-28 (1989); see also
Kaye & Plaia, supra note 23, at 367-73.
79. Clarksupra note 1, at 1153; see Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, USITC Pub. 1126,
Inv. No. 337-TA-69, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 963 (1980) (adopting a test that looks for significant
use of American land, labor, and capital to define domestic industry).
80. These claims might include infringement of common law trademarks, theft of trade
secrets, restraint of trade, monopolization, or other unfair trade practices not addressed by
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those "the threat or effect of which is-(i) to destroy or substantially
injure an industry in the United States; (ii) to prevent the establishment
of such an industry; or (iii) to restrain or monopolize trade and com-
merce in the United States."''s For these claims, the unfair practices still
are defined by their effect on the domestic industry. In addition, the in-
jury to industry requirement is preserved. 2
For claims based on intellectual property rights, however, section
337 now defines as unlawful "the importation into the United States, the
sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after importa-
tion by the owner, importer, or consignee" of articles that infringe a valid
U.S. intellectual property right.83 This definition of unlawful acts no
longer encompasses injury to a U.S. industry; rather the simple importa-
tion of an infringing product now is considered unlawful. Thus, claims
under section 337 need not allege a substantial injury. They still must
allege, however, that a U.S. industry relating to the protected articles
exists or is in the process of being established.8 4 Under section 337, an
"industry" relating to the protected articles exists when there is: signifi-
cant investment in plant and equipment; significant employment of labor
or capital; or substantial investment in exploitation of the intellectual
property right, including engineering, research and development, or li-
censing.85 Ultimately, a claimant need only establish the import of an
infringing article and the existence of a domestic industry related to that
article to prove a section 337 violation; 86 there is no need to show any
injury to that domestic industry.
The removal of the injury to industry requirement from intellectual
property-based cases has been controversial.8 7 It was intended to make
section 337 a more effective weapon in combatting the import of infring-
ing goods by reducing the complainant's burden of proof.88 The Ways
and Means Committee noted that "the injury and efficient and economic
operation requirements of section 337, designed for the broad context
originally intended in the statute, make no sense in the intellectual prop-
erty arena."18 9 One commentator asserts that the original enactment of
other trade laws. Newman, supra note 78, at 576. For further discussion, see Kaye & Plaia,
supra note 23, at 364-66; Nance, supra note 75, at 499-506.
81. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A). The language of the new § 337 universally dispenses with
the "efficiently and economically operated" language. Id.
82. Id. § 1337(a)(1). Claims not based on intellectual property rights are a small portion
of total § 337 proceedings. See infra text accompanying note 92.
83. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)-(D).
84. Id. § 1337(a)(2).
85. Id. § 1337(a)(3).
86. Krosin & Kozlowski, supra note 35, at 48.
87. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1181.
88. Lee D. Green, International Protection of Intellectual Property Under the 1988 Trade
Bill, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 475, 476-77.
89. 1987 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 155.
November 1991]
section 337 was not aimed at combatting infringement of intellectual
property rights but at providing redress for a broad range of unfair acts
that were not covered by other unfair import laws.90 Yet "[t]oday, sec-
tion 337 is predominantly used to enforce U.S. intellectual property
rights." 91 According to a 1986 Government Accounting Office (GAO)
study, ninety-five percent of the section 337 cases initiated since 1974
involve statutory intellectual property rights.92 The Omnibus Act was
enacted to reflect this current reality and tailor section 337's protections
to those who need it most. The Act's statement of findings and purposes
declared that the amendments to section 337 were intended to create "a
more effective remedy for the protection of United States intellectual
property rights."' 93 The Act thus reflects a shift in the underlying policy
from protection of domestic labor and industry towards protection of
statutory intellectual property rights.
A requirement of "injury to a domestic industry" is inconsistent
with the purpose of protecting statutory intellectual property rights. Be-
cause an intellectual property owner has a statutory right to exclude
others from making or selling the protected property in the United
States, the true injury consists of taking away that right.94 The Ways and
Means Committee noted that
Any sale in the United States of an infringing product is a sale that
rightfully belongs only to the holder or licensee of that property. The
importation of any infringing merchandise derogates from the statu-
tory right, diminishes the value of the intellectual property, and thus
indirectly harms the public interest [in encouraging technological
innovation].95
The statute's current language comes closer to recognizing that the in-
jury redressed by section 337 is the loss of the exclusive intellectual prop-
erty right, regardless of whether a U.S. industry utilizing that right may
be economically harmed.
The new section 337 also is consistent with U.S. patent law, which
provides a remedy when an intellectual property right is infringed.96 The
90. Newman, supra note 78, at 572. Newman suggests that § 337 was perceived as an
extension of existing unfair competition and antitrust law to importers who were arguably
beyond the jurisdiction of state and federal courts. Id. at 572 n. 10.
91. 1987 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 155.
92. Id.
93. Omnibus Act, supra note 2, § 1341(b); see Newman, supra note 78, at 572.
94. Newman, supra note 78, at 573.
95. 1987 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 156. The Committee notes that proving the
infringement of a valid intellectual property right should be the only "injury" required. The
"public interest" is the trade-off between giving the intellectual property owner the statutory
right to exclude others from making or selling the protected property and having the protected
property available to the public. Id.
96. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1991) (patents). The patent infringement remedy may
include an injunction, or damages, or both, to compensate for the infringement. Id. §§ 283-
284. Damages consist of at least a reasonable royalty for the use made of the protected inven-
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patent system is constitutionally designed to grant a monopoly to the
patentee in exchange for the public disclosure of the invention.97 There-
fore, the loss of exclusivity is the injury in a patent infringement case.98
In addition, the ITC follows domestic patent law, including both statu-
tory and decisional law, when determining whether a patent infringe-
ment constitutes a section 337 violation.99 Finally, a respondent in a
section 337 action also may use all the same legal and equitable defenses
against the intellectual property holder as a defendant in a district court
action. 10o
Although an injury to industry requirement is one way to exclude
claims from the ITC, Congress was concerned that this requirement
presented too great a burden on intellectual property holders seeking
needed relief from unfair import practices. Congress recognized that "in
very few cases have complainants actually been denied relief [in the sec-
tion 337 forum] because of failure to meet the economic tests relating to
injury and economically and efficiently operated industry."10 1 It also
concluded, however, that some holders of U.S. intellectual property
rights may be discouraged from initiating proceedings given the difficult
burden of proving substantial injury to an "efficiently and economically
operated domestic industry," or because of the high cost involved.10 2 A
tion plus interest and costs as fixed by the court. Id. § 284. Moreover, once a patent is granted
it is presumed valid until the defendant proves noninfringement, or that the patent is invalid or
obtained by fraud. Id. § 282.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (congressional power to "promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
98. The relevant portions of U.S. patent law as to remedies for patent infringement in-
clude: § 284-damages adequate to compensate the patentee for the infringement, but never
less than a reasonable royalty for using the invention; id.-treble damages; and § 285-attor-
ney fees. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-285. A plaintiff need only prove injury to obtain an injunction. 5
DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY
AND INFRINGEMENT § 20.04, at 20-267, 20-290 to 20-295 (1988).
99. Clark, supra note 1, at 1157.
100. Il. at 1159. In a patent context, these include attacks on patent validity, claims that
the patent is unenforceable, and claims that the infringing product is not covered by the patent
claim. Id. A respondent, however, may not assert affirmative defenses in the form of
counterclaims.
101. 1987 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 156. Yet the Committee noted, "according to
GAO's survey, 11 complainants have been unable to meet all of the economic criteria and 6 of
them were denied relief solely for this reason." Id. There is some indication that a failure to
meet the injury requirements, despite a finding of patent infringement, led Congress to elimi-
nate the injury requirement for patent-based § 337 actions. Clark, supra note 1, at 1163; see,
e.g., Coming Glass Works v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1569-71 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (no § 337 violation despite finding of patent infringement); Textron, Inc. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1028-29 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (no § 337 violation be-
cause compainant failed to prove sufficient injury).
102. 1987 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 156; see Keith George, Note, Importation of
Articles Produced by Patented Processes: Unfair Trade Practices or Infringement?, 18 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 129, 137 & n.72 (1984).
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House Committee noted that firms have "terminated their proceedings or
accepted settlement agreements which they judged not in their best inter-
ests because they could not meet all of the statute's economic tests."10 3
Moreover, the cost of section 337 litigation was extremely high, largely
due to the cost of satisfying the economic tests. 14
Elimination of the injury to industry requirement also obviates the
need to conduct two separate trials before the ITC-first proving the
technical infringement issues to show a section 337 violation, and then
proving the economic issues relating to the injury. 10 5 This scheme can be
a substantial burden on a claimant because it usually requires two sepa-
rate groups of counsel to obtain the necessary expertise. This dual proce-
dure also adds significantly to the cost of bringing a claim before the
ITC.10 6 Finally, elimination of the injury requirement reduces the
number of issues before the ITC, thereby increasing administrative
efficiency.107
Examined from this perspective, there is no need for the remaining
requirement that a complainant prove the existence of a domestic indus-
try relating to the protected articles, because any loss of exclusivity
should be enough to trigger section 337 remedies. On the other hand,
there is a need for some barrier to the ITC forum because a U.S. intellec-
tual property owner also has recourse to the federal district courts for
infringement, and the district courts are considered a more fair forum for
respondent importers. In a district court, defendants are not subject to
the ITC's strict time limits, they may assert counterclaims, and any rul-
ing on the validity of the parties' intellectual property rights will have
preclusive effect in subsequent suits.' 0 8 Section 337 thus historically has
been limited by the need to prove not only the existence of a domestic
industry but also harm to that industry, because the administrative reme-
dies were not meant as merely an alternative intellectual property dispute
103. H.R. REP. No. 581, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 111 (1986).
104. 1987 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 156. The Committee noted that litigation
costs range from $100,000 to $1 million, with a few claims costing as much as $2.5 million. In
fact, the legal costs of satisfying the economic criteria are reportedly equal to more than half of
the total litigation expenses. Id.
Easing the standing requirements was apparently so important that the ITC bypassed its
normal notice and comment procedure in implementing the Omnibus Act, and promulgated
interim rules six days after the Act became effective. Newman, supra note 78, at 574 & n.18.
105. Clark, supra note 1, at 1168.
106. Id. at 1168-69.
107. Id. at 1169. This is particularly important in light of the reduced statutory time limit
for determining preliminary relief. Id.
108. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text. A successful defense of fraud in ob-
taining the patent or patent invalidity will not be given preclusive effect in a later district court
action. S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 SENATE RE-
PORT]. The 1988 GATT Panel Report also summarizes the ways that § 337 defendants are
disadvantaged as compared to defendants in a district court action. See infra notes 165-71 and
accompanying text.
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resolution channel. 1°9 Given the potential for disrupting foreign trade
and international relations,"10 the statute must retain its trade character
to ensure that it protects the U.S. economy and its businesses. It is this
latter goal that domestic intellectual property law does not meet. In pre-
serving a barrier to foreign holders of U.S. intellectual property rights,
however, the statute manifests a protective aspect and can be attacked
upon the basis that it is discriminatory. This discriminatory effect is at
the heart of the 1988 GATT Panel ruling.
The Omnibus Act attempted to preserve a barrier to the ITC by
requiring proof of the existence of a domestic industry. The domestic
industry requirement exists to compensate for the removal of the injury
to industry requirement and to keep section 337 a trade statute rather
than an intellectual property statute. Yet the remaining domestic injury
requirement is problematic. Pursuant to the new section 337, an indus-
try is a "domestic industry" if it includes: "(A) significant investment in
plant and equipment; (B) significant employment of labor or capital; or
(C) substantial investment in [exploitation of the intellectual property
right], including engineering, research and development, or licensing."' 11
This language was meant to supplant prior ITC adjudicatory definitions
of "domestic industry" that Congress felt were "inconsistent and unduly
narrow."'1 12 There is little guidance, however, as to when an investment
is "significant," or when the employment of labor or capital is substan-
tial. 113 The Act's statutory language codifies existing ITC case law on
109. The Ways and Means Committee noted that the requirement of proving the existence
of a domestic industry was maintained "in order to preclude holders of U.S. intellectual prop-
erty rights who have no contact with the United States other than owning such intellectual
property rights from utilizing section 337." 1987 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 157.
110. In connection with the Trade Act of 1974, the Senate Committee noted that "the
granting of relief against imports could have a very direct and substantial impact on United
States foreign relations, economic and political." 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 69, at
199. The December 1990 breakdown of GATT talks over agricultural subsidies is a good
example of this type of problem. The talks broke down largely because the European Commu-
nity was unwilling to reduce subsidies for its own agricultural industry. See Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Talks Tops U.S. Trade Agenda for 1991 as Administration, Congress Also
Prepare to Deal with Range of Other Issues, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 60-62 (Jan. 9,
1991). See infra notes 223-30 and accompanying text for another example.
111. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3).
112. 1987 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 157. Clark notes that the initial test requiring
local manufacturing activity was abandoned in 1980 in favor of a "value added" test. Under
this test, a patent holder need not manufacture its product in the U.S. to prove a domestic
industry exists. The holder can show other domestic activities, such as repair and service
activities, which add value to the product, are carried out in the United States. See Clark,
supra note 1, at 1183. Subsequently, the Federal Circuit "struggled to provide some guidance
regarding the level of domestic nonmanufacturing activity sufficient to warrant section 337
protection." Id at 1182-83.
113. Newman, supra note 78, at 579. Newman notes that these ambiguous terms also raise
problems about the way investment in a plant or equipment, or employment of labor or capital
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these first two factors.114 But the third factor is new, and specifically
"does not require actual production of the article in the United States if it
can be demonstrated that significant investment and activities of the type
enumerated are taking place in the United States."115 Congress limited
this rule by stating that marketing and sales activities alone will not be
enough to constitute a domestic industry, nor will mere ownership of
intellectual property rights.11 6 One commentator notes that "unless the
ITC strictly applies this third qualification, it could present a major loop-
hole sufficient to totally bypass the domestic industry requirement."' 1 7
By adopting language that loosely defines the relevant industry, however,
the statute allows flexibility in proof. The ITC may develop interpreta-
should be related to the intellectual property right, and what point in time relative to the
infringing importation these activities should have occurred. Id. at 579-80.
There also may be problems identifying the relevant industry. If the exploitation of the
intellectual property right does not result in production of the actual article of commerce, but
rather produces something incorporated into that article, what is the relevant industry? Is the
"industry" that which produces the ultimate article of commerce or the component? There
also may be several "industries" that are considered one "industry" if the various products
constitute an integrated system, or if a number of patents may be used to produce a single
article of commerce. See Nance, supra note 75, at 507-10.
114. Clark, supra note 1, at 1185. See, ag., Schaper Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 717 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (principal activities of domestic company
occurred outside United States; domestic activities were insufficient in relation to total produc-
tion processes to constitute U.S. industry); Certain Prods. with Gremlins Character Depic-
tions, USITC Pub. 1815, Inv. No. 337-TA-201, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. Decisions (BNA) 1585
(Mar. 1986) (no domestic industry where licensing activities relating to servicing of intellectual
property rights but no production related activities in United States); Certain Toy Vehicles,
USITC Pub. 1300, Inv. No. 337-TA-122, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. Decisions (BNA) 1920 (Oct.
1982) (domestic industry found not to exist where licensing and collection of royalties, but not
manufacture, occurs in United States). See generally Trade Reform Legislation: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 671,
680-81 (1986) (statement of Richard Witte, Vice President Intellectual Property Owners, Inc.)
[hereinafter 1986 Hearings].
115. 1987 House REPORT, supra note 2, at 157. The report states that this element could
encompass universities and other intellectual property owners who may never engage in any
manufacturing but may extensively license their intellectual property rights to manufacturers.
Id Prior case law does not appear to stretch this far. See Schaper Mfg. Co. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 717 F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (design and licensing activities
insufficient to constitute domestic industry); Certain Prods. with Gremlins Character Depic-
tions, USITC Pub. 1815, Inv. No. 337-TA-201, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. Decisions (BNA) 1585,
1586-87 (Mar. 1986) (same). Because this third element is new, however, prior case law may
not limit it in the same way.
116. 1987 House REPORT, supra note 2, at 157.
117. Clark, supra note 1, at 1186. Clark indicates that foreign companies who invest sub-
stantial capital in the United States by purchasing U.S. firms or by investing in research grants,
scholarships, or research and development contracts with U.S. universities, may easily qualify
under the new domestic industry test. Id. at 1187. Moreover, because almost half of all U.S.
patents are now issued to foreign companies, those companies may "close the door on United
States industries seeking to import offshore manufactured products into the United States."
Id. at 1188-89.
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tions of the statutory language using its trade expertise, as it did with the
prior, less explicit, section 337.
Furthermore, the ITC may be guided by the policy behind the do-
mestic industry requirement. Congress was concerned that section 337
would be used as a forum by foreign companies that have little or no
connection to the United States other than ownership of an intellectual
property right: "The purpose of the Commission is to adjudicate trade
disputes between U.S. industries and those who seek to import goods
from abroad. Retention of the requirement that the statute be utilized on
behalf of an industry in the United States retains that essential nexus."' 118
The determination of when a domestic industry exists is best resolved by
the ITC on the basis of its trade expertise because the term domestic
industry is not susceptible to an exhaustive Congressional definition.
Other problems have arisen due to the easing of access requirements
in section 337 intellectual property cases. The elimination of the injury
to industry requirement for only patent, trademark, and copyright com-
plaints creates different standing requirements, and thus differential ac-
cess to the ITC forum. For example, a U.S. patent holder need only
show there is a domestic industry related to the protected articles to gain
standing at the ITC. A complainant alleging theft of trade secrets, how-
ever, also must prove injury to industry to gain standing because section
337 defines intellectual property to cover only the statutory intellectual
property rights-patents, trademarks, and copyrights. This result is con-
sistent with the congressional purpose of making section 337 more acces-
sible to those statutory intellectual property owners who most often seek
its protection. 1 9 Finally, one critic suggests that the changes to section
337 may result in converting the ITC into an international patent court
whose decisions may or may not have the same weight as federal district
court decisions, and may or may not be consistent with federal patent
law. 120
Overlapping jurisdiction on intellectual property infringement issues
also encourages duplicative litigation.1 21 The consequent potential for
118. 1987 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 156-57.
119. Newman, supra note 78, at 581.
120. Id. at 587 & n.80. This potential conflict exists despite the fact that domestic patent
law applies in § 337 actions in determining infringement issues. See also supra Section II.A.(2)
(discussing preclusive effects). Other economic and political considerations set forth in § 337,
as discussed infra Section II.C., may result in inconsistent decisions between the ITC and the
district courts.
121. There are a number of reasons for litigating in both fora. For example, the complain-
ant may wish to recover damages from the respondent, which she may only do in district
court. Also, a complainant who is unsuccessful before the ITC may wish to sue in district
court on the theory that she is not precluded by the ITC determination. See supra text accom-
panying note 71. Finally, a respondent to a patent-based § 337 may wish to obtain a preclusive
judgment of patent invalidity which she may only do through a declaratory action in district
court. Ritscher, et al., supra note 63, at 159; see also Newman, supra note 78, at 587 (if a
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"dual liability" for respondents forced to defend themselves in both the
district courts and the ITC is one of the GATT's main concerns.1 22 Con-
gress appears to rely on the differences in available remedies between the
ITC and the district courts, as well as the domestic industry requirement,
to prevent duplicative litigation and limit the use of section 337. For
example, district court jurisdiction in patent infringement cases usually is
based on in personam jurisdiction,123 whereas an ITC action may pro-
ceed against the infringing importer without the need to establish per-
sonal jurisdiction.1 24 To obtain complete relief for infringement,
including damages, a complainant must proceed in district court, and
therefore any administrative remedy sought is an additional cost. The
goal of preventing duplicative litigation is thus inconsistent with the goal
of making access to the ITC in intellectual property cases more readily
available.125
Given the extensive remedies available in the district courts, section
337 arguably should serve the narrow goal of protecting domestic indus-
tries against unfair acts, rather than vindicating complainants' intellec-
tual property rights. Historically, this goal has been served by some sort
of injury requirement.126 Without the injury to industry requirement,
foreign holders of U.S. intellectual property rights are able to enjoin com-
peting imports more easily. Such actions would significantly broaden the
scope of section 337 beyond its traditional policy goal. On the other
hand, the legislative history urges the ITC to use the domestic industry
requirement to find some "essential nexus" to U.S. industry in its deter-
minations, which is proven by showing some as yet undefined level of
complainant is unsatisfied with the result in one forum she may turn to the other). The threat
of duplicative litigation also may be used to force a party to settle because both proceedings are
usually very expensive.
122. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
123. The New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, Comments on
Possible Amendments to Procedures for Enforcement of Patent Rights Responsive to GA 7T Crit-
icism of Tariff Act § 337, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 700, 705 (1990) [hereinafter
New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association].
124. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1988). The ITC may initiate civil enforcement actions in the
district courts without prior notice to a respondent. Investigations of Unfair Practices in Im-
port Trade, 19 C.F.R. § 211.56(b) (1991). In the district courts, a plaintiff suing for patent
infringement might be able to achieve a similar result by suing a class of defendants under
FED. R. CIv. P. 23. The New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association
notes, however, that this procedure is not used in patent litigation. New York Patent, Trade-
mark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at 705-06. This issue is discussed more
fully infra notes 294-98 and accompanying text.
125. Commentators note that "approximately every third investigation before the ITC is
accompanied by a proceeding in a federal court," despite the added cost of dual proceedings.
Ritscher et al., supra note 63, at 158.
126. Clark, supra note 1, at 1162.
[Vol. 43
domestic activity.127 Congress thus has structured section 337 to main-
tain a tortured balance between conflicting policy goals.
On the other hand, there is evidence that section 337's policy shift
toward pure protection of intellectual property rights was intentional.
One commentator notes that two cases in which the ITC denied relief for
lack of sufficient injury, despite finding unfair acts in importing infring-
ing goods, prompted Congress to amend section 337.128 The 1986 trade
law reform hearings suggest that the Congressional amendments to sec-
tion 337 are based on the premise that any patent infringement injures
the patent holder, regardless of the extent of economic harm from the
infringement. 129
C. Section 337 Procedures, Safeguards, and the Public Interest
This section outlines other changes to section 337 made by the Om-
nibus Act and the public interest limitations on section 337 relief. The
section highlights the balance of conflicting goals preserved in the new
statute, and discusses how public interest factors affect section 337 relief.
There are many procedural safeguards that were added in 1988 that
cause a section 337 action to be more akin to a judicial cause of action
than an administrative proceeding.1 30 These procedural safeguards in-
dude: (1) default procedures against respondents who have been served
with notice and fail to appear or answer the complaint;131 (2) procedures
for handling confidential information; 132 (3) imposition of sanctions for
abuse of discovery and abuse of process; 133 (4) ordering seizure and for-
feiture of respondent's goods if respondent has received notice;134 and (5)
issuance of consent orders or termination of the investigation without
determining whether respondent has violated section 337.135 Some of
127. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
128. See Coming Glass Works v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (relief denied despite infringement of a valid patent because the relevant U.S.
market was expanding faster than the domestic industry's capacity to meet demands, and thus
sales of infringing imports would have no effect on domestic producers' sales); Textron, Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1028-29 (Fed. Cir 1985) (relief denied
because infringing articles did not occupy a significant share of the market and did not cause or
threaten to cause injury to the domestic market). These cases are discussed in depth in Clark,
supra note 1, at 1163-67.
129. 1986 Hearings, supra note 114, at 674.
130. Ritscher, et al., supra note 63, at 158; see Investigations of Unfair Practices in Import
Trade, 19 C.F.R. §§ 210-211 (1991).
131. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1988).
132. Id. § 1337(n).
133. Id. § 1337(h). The ITC may prescribe sanctions to the extent authorized by Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 37. Id.
134. Id. § 1337(i). The ITC may order seizure or forfeiture if: (1) the articles are subject
to an exclusion order; (2) an attempt has been made to import them; and (3) the owner has
been notified that a further attempt to import would result in seizure or forfeiture. Id
135. Id. § 1337(c).
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these changes seem to add to the disadvantages respondents suffer in the
ITC and strengthen the GATT criticisms. To the extent these amend-
ments parallel district court procedures, however, they ensure that for-
eign respondents in the ITC are treated equally with domestic infringers
in the district courts.
After the ITC determines that the respondent violated section 337,
it may issue an exclusion order which bars the import of the infringing
articles by any person. 136 The ITC also may order the respondent to
cease and desist importing the infringing articles, subject to a fine of
$100,000 per day. Upon violating the order, the respondent may be fined
twice the domestic value of the articles per day. 137 The ITC weighs these
remedies against their effect "upon the public health and welfare, com-
petitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like
or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States
consumers."1 38 Thereafter, section 337 requires the ITC to send its find-
ings and orders to the President for review. Unless the President disap-
proves the order for policy reasons within sixty days, the ITC order
becomes final. 139
Although section 337's public interest determination and presiden-
tial review provisions remain essentially unchanged under the Omnibus
Act, these provisions may undermine the purpose of the Omnibus Act
amendments in promoting greater ITC efficiency and lowering burdens
placed on complainants. Although a complainant does not have to prove
injury to industry to receive section 337 relief, injury to industry issues
still are relevant in determining the appropriate scope of the remedy and
in identifying the public interest that might affect that remedy. 14° Be-
cause the ITC has authority to compel discovery on matters relating to
the remedy, public interest, and bonds,1 41 the complainant could have to
pay the very same costs it would have paid if the ITC had to make a
136. Id. § 1337(d).
137. Id. § 1337(0. In the Omnibus Act, Congress significantly increased the amount of
the fine the ITC could levy against infringers. Before 1988, the fine could be as much as
$10,000 per day or the domestic value of the articles per day. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0(2) (1982).
138. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(f) (1988). Identical language appears in the three provisions
that cover temporary exclusion orders, permanent exclusion orders, and cease and desist
orders.
139. Id § 1337(j). The statute is silent on what these "policy" considerations are, and the
only decisional law on this point suggests that presidential policy determinations are not sub-
ject to judicial review. See Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d
1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (President may disapprove an ITC order for policy reasons only.)
140. Newman, supra note 78, at 577. Newman notes that the ITC's rules encourage the
development of a record relating to remedy and public interest determinations, particularly in
temporary relief proceedings. See Investigations of Unfair Practices in Import Trade, 19
C.F.R. § 210.24(e)(1)(B) (1991) (motion for temporary relief should allege immediate and sub-
stantial harm to the domestic industry).
141. 19 C.F.R. § 210.24(e)(18); see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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finding of injury to industry. Moreover, removing the injury to industry
requirement may shift the injury determination to the President as part
of the policy review. 142
The legislative history, however, is explicit in its intent: "The Com-
mittee does not intend that the USITC or the [President] will reintroduce
[injury] requirements in making their public interest determinations."1 43
Similarly, the President is limited to considering the propriety of any
remedy, not the substance of ITC findings. As the President should not
use the policy review to overturn ITC findings, 144 injury to industry is-
sues should not constitute grounds for presidential disapproval of ITC
orders. Nevertheless, at least one commentator is convinced that "litiga-
tion of the 'economic issues'... will survive to some extent in the ambi-
guities of the new 'domestic' industry test and in issues relevant to
remedy and public interest factors."' 45 As a result, it is unclear what
effect the former injury to industry requirement will have on new section
337 actions.
Others argue that the ITC should go beyond a threshold finding that
a domestic industry exists and consider injury to industry issues in its
public policy determination even if it does not consider injury to industry
during its investigation.1 46 Finally, one commentator asserts that the
President may take a more active role in reviewing section 337 determi-
nations. He suggests that the President is likely to disapprove more ITC
actions, which in turn would discourage new complainants seeking re-
lief. 147 Given Congress' firm legislative intent to confine presidential dis-
142. "[L]ack of injury may [become] a trade related public policy issue properly consid-
ered by the President." Clark, supra note 1, at 1169-70. Only a few ITC orders have been
disapproved by the President. See, eg., Certain Alkaline Batteries, 49 Fed. Reg. 45,275 (1984)
(Presidential disapproval unsuccessfully challenged); Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel In-
serts and Methods for Their Installation, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,485 (1982) (Presidential disapproval
for potential discriminatory treatment for imported products as against domestic products);
Certain Multi-Ply Head Boxes & Papermaking Mach., 46 Fed. Reg. 32,361 (1981) (no need for
broad exclusion order); Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe & Tube, USITC Pub. No. 863,
Inv. No. 337-TA-29, 1 Int'l Trade Rep. Decisions (BNA) 5245 (1978) (Treasury Department
sanctions sufficient remedy).
Clark indicates that the removal of the injury to industry requirement means economic
issues relating to injury will not be developed during the ITC investigation. This may restrict
the amount of information available to the President, who must rely on the arguments of
counsel. Clark, supra note 1, at 1171.
143. 1987 Housa REPORT, supra note 2, at 156.
144. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 69, at 198-99.
145. Newman, supra note 78, at 588.
146. 1986 Hearings, supra note 114, at 694 (statement of the ITC Trial Lawyers
Association).
147. Clark, supra note 1, at 1171-72. Clark argues that:
[Tihere is a greater risk that the President will disapprove relief even after the com-
plainant has borne the cost associated with proving a violation under the amended
statute at the evidentiary hearing, briefing and arguing those same issues before the
full Commission, and preparing briefs for the President on public policy issues.
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cretion,148 however, presidential actions are likely to play a minor role in
the overall resolution of section 337 cases.
D. Conflicts with the GAT]T
The GATT is a broad multilateral trade agreement to which the
United States has been a signator since its inception in 1947.149 It pro-
motes policies of nondiscrimination and fair competition among member
nations.' 50 Article III provides a "cornerstone" of the GATT:151
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treat-
ment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribu-
tion, or use. 152
Exemptions from the GATT's general provisions appear in article XX:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing ... shall...
prevent the adoption or enforcement... of measures:... (d) necessary
to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsis-
tent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to
customs enforcement,. . . the protection of patents, trade marks and
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices.' 53
This "necessity clause" creates an exception to general obligations under
the GATT in circumstances in which it is necessary to secure compliance
with domestic laws and regulations.1 54
Id at 1172. Because there have been so few ITC decisions overturned by the President, how-
ever, it is unlikely that presidential discretion will have a significant impact on the disposition
of future cases. See supra note 142.
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. GATT, supra note 7, 55 U.N.T.S. at 194.
150. Id at A12, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-98, pmbl. ("reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce"). Nondiscrimination
also is explicitly provided for in art. III, and special treatment is afforded to developing coun-
tries in arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII. See EDMOND McGoVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGU-
LATION: GATT, THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY §§ 9.1-9.4, at 272-
83 (1986) (clarifying special exceptions).
151. Jeffrey S. Neeley & Hideto Ishida, Section 337 and National Treatment Under GA7T"
A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 276, 278 n.13 (1989-90).
152. GATT, supra note 7, art. III, at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 206. The equal treatment prin-
ciple of this clause is referred to as "national treatment."
153. Id art. XX, at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262 (emphasis added).
154. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 280. There is another exception to general obliga-
tions under the GATT for legislation existing before the GATT's signing-the "grandfather"
provision. McGOVERN, supra note 150, § 1.132, at 18-19. The substantial alterations in the
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In 1983, a GATT panel considered discrimination charges leveled at
section 337 in intellectual property cases. The panel considered a claim
by Canada that imports received differential treatment under section 337
after an ITC general exclusion order barred all import of goods that in-
fringed a valid U.S. patent. The 1983 GATT Panel Report, however,
upheld the U.S. application of section 337 under the necessity clause.
The panel found that a district court remedy "would not have provided a
satisfactory and effective means of protecting [the complainant's] patent
rights against importation of the infringing product." 155 Because a dis-
trict court action would have been effective only against parties to the
action and not against other foreign infringers or potential users of the
infringing product in the United States, 156 the complainant would have
to resort to section 337 to avoid these problems.' 57
The 1983 GATT Panel Report concluded that, in principle, the ne-
cessity clause would apply to many cases of patent infringement. The
report, however, specifically left open the "strong possibility" that there
could be cases in which a district court procedure would give the patent
holder an effective remedy, thus making a section 337 action unneces-
sary.158 The Panel noted that its findings were made on the basis of the
then existing section 337, which included an injury to industry compo-
nent in determining whether an "unfair act" had occurred.15 9 The 1983
GATT Panel Report stated that "certain elements contained in Section
337, having a direct bearing on the use of the Section, appeared to be out
of place in legislation used for the protection of private patent rights,"
and that the injury to industry requirement was such an element.16 This
statement highlights the United States' dilemma: The United States can-
not rely on the necessity clause-which exempts intellectual property
laws from GATT national treatment constraints-to justify a statute that
protects more than intellectual property rights-namely, domestic indus-
try and labor. Yet the 1983 report avoided the ITC's procedural unfair-
ness to respondents: its strict time limits, and the possibility of dual
1988 legislation, however, remove § 337 from this exception. Clark, supra note 1, at 1175;
1986 Hearings, supra note 114, at 695 (statement of the ITC Trial Lawyers Association).
155. United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GATT Doe. L/5333
(May 26, 1983), compiled in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC IN-
STRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 107, 126 (30th Supp. 1984) [hereinafter 1983
GATT Panel Report].
156. Id at 126.
157. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 281.
158. 1983 GATT Panel Report, supra note 155, at 127.
159. Clark, supra note I, at 1176.
160. 1983 GATT Panel Report, supra note 155, at 128. Ultimately the Panel concluded
that this observation was "irrelevant" in determining which "essential elements" of patent-
based legislation are "necessary." Id
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liability before the ITC and the U.S. district courts. 161 These issues re-
surfaced before the GATT in 1988.
In 1988, the European Community (EC) filed a complaint under the
GATT, alleging that section 337 discriminates against foreign compa-
nies.162 The complaint was part of a process patent case which resulted
in an ITC exclusion order.1 63 It also resulted in the 1988 GATT Panel
Report, which found that section 337 violated GATT's national treat-
ment provisions.164 The 1988 GATT Panel Report examined the alleged
discriminatory aspects of section 337 and found that the section accorded
non-U.S. goods less favorable treatment than domestically produced
goods, violating article III in six respects.1 65 First, complainants have a
choice of forum in which to challenge imported products, whereas no
corresponding choice is available to challenge domestic products. 166 Sec-
ond, there is a potential disadvantage to producers or importers of chal-
lenged products that results from the short time limits under section 337;
domestic producers are not subject to a comparable time limit.1 67 Third,
counterclaims are not available to respondents in a section 337 proceed-
ing 168 Fourth, there is the possibility that general exclusion orders may
result from section 337 proceedings, whereas no comparable remedy is
available against infringing domestic products.169 Fifth, exclusion orders
are enforced automatically by the U.S. Customs Service, yet enforcement
of injunctive relief against domestic products requires the successful
complainant to bring an enforcement proceeding in district court.170
Sixth, producers or importers of challenged products may have to defend
their products before the ITC and in federal district courts; there is, how-
ever, no dual exposure with respect to domestic products.171
After examining section 337's discriminatory aspects, the Panel
found that the ITC's issuance of limited in rem exclusion orders, and in
161. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 281.
162. 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 8, at 354. The case involved the import of
aramid fibers produced by a Dutch company, Akzo, N.V. The import allegedly infringed a
U.S. process patent held by the U.S. company DuPont. In contrast to the 1983 dispute, Akzo
and DuPont settled, leaving only the broad EC challenge to § 337. Neeley & Ishida, supra
note 151, at 282.
163. Neely & Ishida, supra note 151 at 282.
164. The findings of this report were based on the pre-Omnibus Act § 337. New York
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at 701 n.3. The criti-
cisms of the 1988 Panel Report, however, focus on elements that are found in the new § 337.
Id. at 704. The 1983 GATT Panel avoided finding a § 337 violation by applying the necessity
clause. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
165. 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 8, at 391.
166. Id
167. Id
168. Id
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id
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some circumstances general in rem exclusion orders, could be justified
for imported products under the necessity clause.172 Additionally, auto-
matic exclusion by the U.S. Customs Service was necessary to make
those orders effective173 because a district court remedy might not pro-
vide effective relief to a U.S. patent holder.174 The Panel also found that
short and fixed time limits could justify expeditious preliminary relief,
provided there were safeguards to protect the importers' legitimate inter-
ests if the ITC ultimately found no section 337 violation. 175 These time
limits, however, could not justify the expeditious conclusion of section
337 investigations.1 76
The 1988 GATT Panel Report concludes with a recommendation
that the United States should amend section 337 to conform to its GATT
obligations.1 77 This recommendation has important consequences be-
cause under the terms of the GATT, a member nation may seek retalia-
tion.178 Although there is disagreement on the likelihood of retaliation
by GATT members, 179 there is no doubt that considerable political fric-
tion will continue and increase. Moreover, the Omnibus Act is "bound
to affect many of the mechanisms of the implementation of U.S. trade
law and policy in ways which may well exacerbate international conflicts
and ill feeling in the years ahead."' 80 For example, a U.S. practitioner
suggests that, should the United States fail to modify section 337 proce-
dures, the Japanese might discriminate against foreign parties to the
same extent the United States discriminates under section 337.181 A
172. Id. at 394-95.
173. Id. at 395.
174. It should be noted that the Panel seems to rely on the same reasoning as the 1983
GATT Panel. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
175. The Omnibus Act has added at least one such safeguard to § 337 by authorizing the
ITC to request the complainant to post bond as a prerequisite to temporary relief. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(e)(2) (1988). The ITC regulations favor requiring this bond in all cases. Investigations
of Unfair Practices in Import Trade, 19 C.F.R. § 210.24(e)(1)(iii)(E). This provision, however,
does not protect respondents effectively. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
176. 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 8, at 395.
177. Id. at 396.
178. GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII, at A64, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266, 268.
179. The ITC Trial Lawyers Association considers retaliation "a real alternative." 1986
Hearings, supra note 114, at 694. Neeley & Ishida suggest that the U.S. may never comply
with the 1988 GATT Panel Report. They cite two reports: a study of the history of compli-
ance with adverse GATT panel reports, which suggests that the U.S. has failed to comply with
half of the panel's eight adverse rulings; and a GATT report on trade policy in the U.S., which
found that although the U.S. has complied with most GATT rulings, it has delayed compli-
ance with four recent panel findings. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 286-87.
180. SIDNEY GOLT, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS 1986-90: ORIGINS, ISSUES & PROSPECTS
56 (1988). Golt notes that the Omnibus Act legislation is "much more informed by economic
nationalism and protectionist sentiment than any United States trade legislation since the
1930s." Id.
181. Harold C. Wegner, Improved U.S. Patent Enforcement Procedures: Modifying Sec-
tion 337, 4 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 83 (April 1990).
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British lawyer also has argued that there should not be separate law for
parties with intellectual property problems, and that import problems
and domestic intellectual property problems should be treated alike.' 82
The United States blocked adoption of the 1988 GATT Panel Re-
port until November 7, 1989183 and has declared that it will await the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations to amend
section 337. 184 This begs the question of whether any substantive man-
date will emerge from the Uruguay Round that will guide the United
States in amending section 337. Moreover, talks officially collapsed in
December 1990, the month in which they were to conclude, but resumed
in June 1991.185 Given the current disarray of the Uruguay Round nego-
tiations, it is unlikely that the Round will offer a substantive intellectual
property proposal.
E. The Uruguay Round of the GATr
The issue of international intellectual property protection has been
the subject of the current Uruguay Round GATT talks.' 8 6 The Declara-
tion initiating the Uruguay Round provided for a working group to study
trade related intellectual property issues (TRIPs).18 7 The group was
formed in response to initiatives from the United States, Japan, and the
182. U.S. Section 337, EC Rules of Origin Causing Bilateral Trade Frictions, ABA Session
Hears, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1274 (Aug. 15, 1990), [hereinafter Trade Frictions]
(comments of Ian Forrester during a meeting at the American Bar Association's annual con-
vention on August 6, 1990); see § 337, EC Rules of Origin Causing Trade Frictions, ABA Ses-
sion Hears, 4 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 218 (Sept. 1990).
183. Heinz Sees Difficulty In Changing U.S. Law Found to be Incompatible With GATT
Rules, 6 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1467 (Nov. 15, 1989) [hereinafter GAYTRules];
GA77 Council Finds That Section 337 Discriminates Against Foreign Companies, 39 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 955, at 29-30 (Nov. 9, 1989) [hereinafter GA TT Coun-
cil Finds].
184. GA YT Council Finds, supra note 183, at 30. The U.S. is delaying amending the stat-
ute in hopes of getting an effective border control provision through the negotiations on trade-
related intellectual property issues. Trade Frictions, supra note 182, at 1274.
185. Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Talks Tops U.S. Trade Agenda for 1991 As
Administration, Congress Also Prepare to Deal with Range of Other Issues, 8 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 2, at 60 (Jan. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Uruguay Round]. The talks collapsed largely
because of increasing disagreement over EC agricultural subsidies. The current status of the
GATT negotiations is discussed infra at notes 213-222 and accompanying text.
186. The Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations was initiated by the Punta del Este
Declaration on September 19, 1986. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Declara-
tion of 20 September 1986, compiled in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE,
BASIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocUMENTS 19, 19 (33rd Supp. 1987) [hereinafter
Punta del Este Declaration]. The Uruguay Round is the eighth in a series of multilateral trade
negotiations. GOLT, supra note 180, at 1. The Uruguay Round is the first round in which
trade related aspects of intellectual property are officially on the agenda. These issues have not
been negotiated in any previous round, although they have been raised. Id. at 41.
187. Punta del Este Declaration, supra note 186, at 25-26. The group's objectives were
outlined as follows:
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EC, which complained of discrepancies among national laws on intellec-
tual property protection.188 One commentator has declared that the U.S.
motivation in 1986 was obvious: the U.S. administration was wrestling
with a surge of protectionism in Congress manifesting itself in protec-
tionist legislation.18 9
Both the EC and the United States have introduced specific propos-
als on the issue of international intellectual property protection. In April
1990, the EC proposed a draft agreement on TRIPs. 190 It is unclear
whether this proposal includes the kind of control measures, specifically
automatic enforcement at the border, that the United States requires
before it will reform section 337.
The Administration's interpretation of the trade laws shows a slavish
devotion to rules of the GATT which few of our trading partners take
as seriously.
The [Ways and Means] Committee is aware that some provisions
of the [Omnibus] bill will be criticized for going beyond the scope of
international understandings. These criticisms, however, ignore the
basic dilemma confronting us in international trade: our competitive-
ness is being undermined by policies and practices which the rules of
GATT and other agreements do not adequately discipline .... [W]e
must demonstrate to our trading partners that we will protect our na-
tional economic interests until such discipline exists. 191
The developing countries, however, voiced major opposition to the
U.S. proposal on the ground that it is inserting an entire system of new
obligations into an "obscure" GATT article. 192 In May 1990, the United
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade, and
taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellec-
tual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellec-
tual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the
negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new
rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles, rules
and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, taking into ac-
count work already undertaken in the GATT.
These negotiations shall be without prejudice to other complementary initiatives
that may be taken in the World Intellectual Property Organization and elsewhere to
deal with these matters.
Id.
188. GOLT, supra note 180, at 42. Some countries provide no protection, and others inad-
equate protection, for new technology in the areas of patent, trademark, copyright, and indus-
trial designs. Id.
189. Id. at 51.
190. EC Proposal Covers Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, 39 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 976, at 490 (Apr. 12, 1990) [hereinafter EC Proposal]. This proposal
focuses on the establishment of international norms for trade secrecy, and minimum commit-
ments to enforce intellectual property rights under a new trade regime. Id. at 491.
191. H.R. REP. No. 581, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 5-6 (1986).
192. IdM These countries claim that the proposal is not in accord with the Punta del Este
Declaration, that it deprives developing countries that do not have the financial means to
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States presented a draft agreement on TRIPs.193 Part 3 of the U.S. Pro-
posal outlines enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property
rights. 194 It provides for civil, criminal, or administrative remedies, or a
combination thereof, for infringement and specifically includes at-border
enforcement procedures.1 95 This Part states that all procedures must be
fair, equitable, and judicially reviewable. 196 The procedures set forth are
not specific, but rather delineate the scope of the parties' rights: to writ-
ten notice of the basis of the claims; to independent counsel; to have
procedures that are not overly burdensome with respect to personal ap-
pearances; to present relevant evidence to establish the validity and in-
fringement of the intellectual property rights at issue; to protection of
confidential information; and to a decision based only on evidence with
respect to which the party had an opportunity to be heard.197
Unlike the current section 337, however, all procedures under the
U.S. proposal would provide for complete recovery, including damages,
injunctive or provisional relief, forfeiture, and exclusion from commer-
cial channels.198 The proposal is silent, however, on the issue of counter-
claims against an intellectual property right-holder, and it provides little
guidance as to the scope of an administrative proceeding. Section 2 gov-
erns civil and administrative procedures together, and specifically entitles
the right-holder to claim damages. 199 Article 13 permits contracting par-
ties to provide for administrative procedures which correspond in sub-
stance to judicial proceedings. 20°
To avoid frivolous applications, the proposal also provides that a
right-holder must post security to obtain temporary at-border relief.201
The proposal is silent, however, on whether these securities can be
awarded to the injured importer in an unsuccessful exclusion
proceeding.202
patent certain products of access to those products, and that it is "bizarre" to use the GATT's
"obscure" article IX as a basis for inserting a whole new system of intellectual property obliga-
tions into the GATT. Id. Article IX requires that each member of the GATT accord "treat-
ment with regard to marking requirements no less favorable than the treatment accorded to
like products of any third country." GATT, supra note 7, art. IX, at A29, 55 U.N.T.S. at 220.
193. United States Submits TRIPS Proposal to GATT, 40 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) No. 981, at 72-73 (May 17, 1990) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal]. The draft agreement was
presented at the May 14-17, 1990 meeting of the GATT's TRIPs negotiating group.
194. Id. Part 3, at 83-86.
195. Id. art. 1, at 83-84.
196. Id. art. 2, at 84.
197. Id. § 2, art. 5, at 84. These provisions do not appear to differ significantly from cur-
rent section 337 procedures.
198. Id. arts. 7-9, at 84-85.
199. Id. arts. 1,8 at 84-85.
200. Id. art. 13, at 85. Thus, the administrative forum should allow counterclaims because
they are available in all civil proceedings. See FED. R. CIv. P. 13.
201. U.S. Proposal, supra note 193, art. 17, at 86.
202. Id. The proposal does specify that an injured respondent is entitled to indemnifica-
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U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills characterized the proposal as
a "virtual 'bill of rights' for intellectual property[;] ... its aim is to estab-
lish basic principles for the enforcement of those rights by courts and
through administrative action by customs authorities. 20 3 The U.S. Pro-
posal, however, appears to extinguish any difference between judicial and
administrative proceedings. This development is important because it
could eliminate the need for a section 337 action altogether. Therefore, if
the U.S. Proposal is adopted, Congress may repeal section 337 entirely.
Finally, the proposal makes no attempt to require either the existence of
a domestic industry, or an economic injury to an industry, as a prerequi-
site for obtaining exclusionary relief.
Because the U.S. Proposal strictly focuses on the protection of intel-
lectual property rights, it is inconsistent with the protectionist trade pol-
icy underlying section 337. U.S. Ambassador Rufus Yerxa has stated
that any changes to section 337 are best accomplished by implementing
legislation at the Uruguay Round's conclusion.2°4 There are strong do-
mestic political reasons for this delay. By lumping section 337 reform
with an implementing bill that emerges under the Omnibus Act's fast
track procedures, the U.S. administration may make it more difficult to
amend the changes to section 337, and thereby avoid a fight in Con-
gress.205 The fast track treatment is crucial because there is domestic
political pressure not to weaken section 337. Section 337 reform that is
not part of a GATT package might be significantly amended or under-
mined by members of Congress with a protectionist bent. The Presi-
dent's Industry Policy Advisory Committee has warned against the
inherent risk of diluting U.S. trade laws when negotiating concessions in
other areas. 20 6 The Committee declared that the U.S. objective should be
to tighten international disciplines rather than weaken U.S. law.20 7 Don-
ald Duvall, a former ITC Administrative Law Judge, notes that "Section
337 [is] critical in protecting U.S. industries and that any problems found
tion for wrongful detention. Id. art 19. Indemnification would provide a successful respon-
dent a claim against the losing complainant. This remedy, however, is unrelated to the issue of
compensation for the wrongful detention.
203. Id. at 73.
204. GATT Council Adopts, supra note 8, at 1467.
205. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 286. Under the fast-track procedure, Congress is
limited to approval or disapproval of an agreement arising out of the GATT negotiations with-
out the ability to amend the agreement. Uruguay Round, supra note 185, at 60.
206. IPAC Report Endorses U.S. Uruguay Round Positions but Warns Against Tradeoffs, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1442 (Sept. 19, 1990) [hereinafter IPAC Report]. For exam-
ple, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Julius Katz has stated that differences between the
United States and the EC over agricultural subsidies have "poisoned" the negotiations. U.S.
Official Raises Prospect of Agreement in GAYT Talks Despite Current Differences, 7 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1774 (Nov. 21, 1990).
207. IPAC Report, supra note 206, at 1442.
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by GATT could be 'rectified by fine tuning the statute.' ",208 Moreover,
not only did the United States block adoption of the 1988 GATT Panel
Report for one year,20 9 but the United States also "did not join that con-
sensus or accept the report's findings." 210 U.S. Ambassador Rufus Yerxa
pointed out: "The United States cannot accept a diminution of the safe-
guards which currently exist for our trademark, patent and copyright
holders facing worldwide competition. ' 211 Thus, it appears that the
United States will resist amending section 337 in response to the 1988
GATT Panel Report until some significant changes are made in the
GATT. "Implicit in the report is the message that a national system
which ignores intellectual property altogether is more consistent with
GATT than one which affords high levels of respect for human inven-
tions but treats imports differently[;] ... such a backward result requires
us to change GATT rules in this area." 212
Nonetheless, there also are strong reasons not to wait for a resolu-
tion of intellectual property issues within GATT before addressing inter-
national concerns about section 337, because a solution that is
satisfactory from the U.S. perspective may not emerge from the GATT
at all. The GATT negotiations collapsed on December 7, 1990, due to
conflicts on the issue of agricultural reform.2 13 In late February 1991,
the EC agreed to certain crucial concessions in this area, thereby reviving
the Uruguay Round talks.214 Despite revival of the talks, many com-
mentators believe a comprehensive TRIPs agreement is unlikely.215
Before the collapse, the United States anticipated an agreement that
would be "broad and shallow," with little progress in key areas, includ-
ing intellectual property protection. 216 The focus thus far in the intellec-
208. Trade Frictions, supra note 182, at 1274; § 337, EC Rules of Origin Causing Trade
Frictions, ABA Session Hears, 4 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 219 (Sept. 1990).
209. GA7T Council Adopts, supra note 8, at 1466.
210. Id. at 1467. Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Bruce Wilson also suggested that
the "President will not use the report as a basis for invoking his public policy veto power to
disapprove International Trade Commission determinations in Section 337 cases." Id.
211. GATT Council Finds, supra note 183, at 30.
212. Id. (statement of Ambassador Yerxa).
213. Uruguay Round, supra note 185, at 60.
214. Clyde H. Farnsworth, Revival of GAT Talks Stirs U.S. Trade Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1991, at Cl.
215. See Experts Pessimistic About Talks on Non-TariffMeasures, Intellectual Property, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1150 (July 31, 1991) [hereinafter Experts Pessimistic] (com-
ments of two trade experts at a House Technology Subcommittee meeting); EC Officials Ex-
press Concern over Unresolved Intellectual Property Issues, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at
1047 (July 10, 1991); Industry Fears Weakened Protection Under Gatt and Other Multilateral
Pacts, 42 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1032, at 91-92 (May 23, 1991) (com-
ments of major industry representatives at a Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks meeting).
216. Uruguay Round Seen Likely to Lead to "Shallow" Agreement on Many Issues, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1806 (Nov. 28, 1990). Despite its broad goals, the U.S. has been
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tual property talks has been to obtain agreement on minimum standards
of intellectual property protection. 217 There are deep divisions between
the developed and developing countries on these issues, however, that
must be resolved before any solution can be adopted. 218 For these rea-
sons, the Round is more likely to result in an intellectual property code
with limited membership, rather than a new GATT article.2 19 Such a
code would lie outside the GATT and bind only its contracting parties.
For example, the United States has begun negotiations with Canada and
Mexico for a new North American Free Trade Agreement, which the
U.S. Trade Representative believes offers "an unprecedented opportunity
to conclude a model international agreement for protecting basic intellec-
tual property rights.' 220 A limited membership code, however, may not
sufficiently "change" the GATT rules for the United States to abandon
section 337 because such negotiations for a limited membership agree-
ment actually may undermine efforts within GATT.221 The weak GATT
protections, however, also provide a reason to strengthen domestic retali-
forced to scale down its expectations. Additionally, the Director General of the GAIT, Ar-
thur Dunkel, noted that in the area of TRIPs, "the basic question of whether [they] belong in
GATIT at all has not been [r]esolved." Brussels Meeting to Conclude Uruguay Round in Jeop-
ardy, Director General Dunkel Warns, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1723 (Nov. 14,
1990) [hereinafter Brussels Meeting].
217. Carol J. Bilzi, Towards an Intellectual Property Agreement in the GA YT: View from
the Private Sector, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343, 348 (1989). For further discussion of the
Round's goals in achieving an intellectual property agreement, see Symposium, Intellectual
Property Protection: A United States Priority, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 336 (1989); David
Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights: The Issues in GAT, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893 (1989) (discussing existing GATT provisions and the goals of
the TRIPs negotiating group).
218. EC Proposal, supra note 190, at 491. Third World countries claim that the GATT's
role in intellectual property matters should be sharply circumscribed and that the World Intel-
lectual Property Association ("WIPO"), in which the developing countries have a built-in ma-
jority, should take the lead on these issues. Id WIPO is one of the fifteen specialized agencies
of the United Nations system of organizations. The EC's chief negotiator, Peter Mogens-Carl,
however, responded that "there is nothing in our text which is in the slightest way in conflict
with WIPO" and because much intellectual property work is trade-related, GATT should be
the dominant forum. Id.
Third World journalists claim that the EC Proposal is an attempt to erode the authority
of WIPO. There has been a continuing dispute throughout the Uruguay Round as to whether
WIPO or GATT should have final responsibility for intellectual property matters. Id This
issue has not yet been resolved. See Brussels Meeting, supra note 216, at 1723.
219. Intellectual Property Code Most Likely Outcome of GATT Talks, PMA Official Says, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1306 (Aug. 22, 1990).
220. Fast-Track Intellectual Property Issues Considered by Senate and House Panels, 42
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1031, at 48 (May 16, 1991). The U.S. Trade
Representative also notes that such an agreement could be used in future bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements. Id
221. See Experts Pessimistic, supra note 215, at 91-92.
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atory measures. 222 Therefore, such an agreement would be unlikely to
influence Congress to amend section 337 and create intellectual property
protection without a protectionist element.
The consequences of the Round's failure to resolve intellectual prop-
erty problems could lead to increased international criticism of section
337. In the context of the increasing division between the United States
and the EC on agricultural subsidies, Representative Dan Glickman of
the House Agriculture Committee suggests that the failure of the Round
would mean "the beginning of a trade war between the United States and
the European Community that will be very expensive for both sides" and
that "Congress will be 'much more assertive, probably much more
protectionist.' "223
Finally, one commentator suggests a novel reason for fast action in
amending section 337 to comply with the 1988 GATT Panel Report. If
another country delayed implementing a GATT finding similar to the
1988 GATT Panel Report, the United States would be required to follow
special retaliatory procedures. Section 301 of the original Tariff Act of
1930 was supplemented in 1988 under the Omnibus Act to provide au-
thority to the U.S. Trade Representative to retaliate against other states'
unreasonable or discriminatory acts.224 Section 301 first requires the
United States to single out "priority" foreign countries that deny ade-
quate intellectual property rights or that deny fair market access to intel-
lectual property right-holders. 225 Once a country is classified as a
"priority," the U.S. Trade Representative must investigate and determine
whether to retaliate within six months.226 Retaliation can include the
suspension of concessions contained in trade agreements or the imposi-
tion of import restrictions. 227 Moreover, retaliation may be mandatory
when the foreign country acts to deny national treatment with respect to
intellectual property protection.228 The irony is that "if the world intel-
lectual property regime that the United States envisions emerging out of
the Uruguay Round bears any resemblance to the U.S. law, U.S. Section
337 practice would be a prime example of the practice that would require
222. See Uruguay Round, supra note 185, at 60-61 (comments on the use of retaliatory
measures); see supra text accompanying note 191.
223. USTR Hills Underscores U.S. Willingness to Negotiate Beyond Brussels on GATT
Pact, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1793 (Nov. 28, 1990) (quoting Representative Dan
Glickman).
224. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1988); Morgan Lewis Joelson, et al., U.S. Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 16 INT'L Bus. LAW. 408, 408-09 (1988); Howard Russell,
Note, Overview ofAmendments in the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bills Section 301, "Super 301, " and
337, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 729, 729-30.
225. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 287-88.
226. 19 U.S.C. § 2414 (1988).
227. Id. § 2411(c)(1).
228. Russell, supra note 224, at 730.
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retaliation. ' 229  Moreover, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Bruce
Wilson has suggested that if the GATT negotiations are not successful,
eventually we will be in a situation of open confrontations with some of
our trading partners, unable to achieve the delicate balancing act
achieved to date, and we will have to use [section] 301 as a legal basis
for trade retaliation rather than as a tool for leverage in our bilateral
negotiations.230
As a definitive Uruguay Round mandate on section 337 reform is
unlikely, changes to section 337 should be dictated by the need to con-
form to the 1988 GATT Panel Report's conclusions. The United States
can no longer delay section 337 reform on the ground that it is awaiting a
GATT solution. The United States also will be faced with increased in-
ternational pressure to implement the 1988 GATT Panel Report recom-
mendations. Without a GATT solution, there is less chance that
Congress will abandon section 337 in favor of strictly judicial remedies,
and a greater chance that domestic pressure will influence Congress to
maintain section 337's protectionist characteristics.
I. The Conflicting Efforts to Reform Section 337
This Part discusses several reform efforts proposed by commenta-
tors and legislators to amend section 337. These efforts focus on retain-
ing section 337 as an essential remedial measure for intellectual property
right-holders. While commentators note the need to conform to the re-
cent GATT criticisms, the legislative initiatives illustrate Congress' at-
tempts to strengthen the statute's protectionist flavor beyond the 1988
amendments, regardless of the section's inconsistency with the GATT.
A. The Commentators
(1) Neeley & Ishida Proposal
In response to the 1988 GATT Panel Report, a proposal by Jeffrey
S. Neeley and Hideto Ishida emphasized the need to retain immediate
relief in the case of infringing imports. 231 These practitioners note the
GATT has recognized that some form of expeditious relief may qualify
as a "necessary" remedy under GATT's necessity clause.232 Therefore,
they propose two major amendments that preserve the expeditious rem-
edy and maintain "national treatment" under the GATT. They suggest
that further amendments guaranteeing complete "national treatment"
are not required because any remaining conflicts with the GAIT can be
defended as "necessary. '233
229. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 288-89.
230. GATT Council Adopts, supra note 8, at 1468.
231. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 292.
232. Id. at 284; see 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 8, at 394-95.
233. "[I]t would be possible for the United States to argue persuasively that any differences
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Neeley and Ishida propose that section 337 be opened to all U.S.
intellectual property holders regardless of nationality. They also suggest
that all standing requirements, including existence of a domestic indus-
try, be eliminated when the basis of the claim is an intellectual property
right, because these requirements establish a distinction based solely on
the national origin of the goods.2 34 Such a distinction, they argue,
"plainly is a violation of the U.S. obligation to provide national treatment
for foreign merchandise. '235 Moreover, "[w]ith discrimination based on
the national origin of the property holder, it is apparent that it is not the
intellectual property system that is being protected, but U.S. compa-
nies."'236 As long as there are requirements that maintain a distinction
based on national origin of the goods, section 337 is not defensible as
"necessary" to protect the intellectual property system. Thus, section
337 will violate the GATT's primary mandate of national treatment.237
Neeley and Ishida suggest that the fear of a massive increase in the
number of section 337 cases, caused by opening the forum to all U.S.
intellectual property holders, is exaggerated. They suggested that most
section 337 cases involve relatively low technology items, and that the
largest number of foreign U.S. patent holders are high technology
companies. 23s
Another commentator notes that in the first twelve months after the
Omnibus Act, "there [was] one possibly high-technology investigation
launched for cellular phones, which hardly creates an 'industry' usage for
even that one industry. '23 9
As a second major reform, Neeley and Ishida would restrict section
337's statutory time limits to the determination of preliminary relief,24°
and modify the bond requirements to protect the parties more ade-
quately.241 The 1988 GATT Panel Report concedes that provisions for
expeditious preliminary relief are consistent with the GATT, provided
between the treatment of imports under Section 337 and the treatment of goods in domestic
commerce are 'necessary,' because of the greater difficulties that are inherent in international
commerce." Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 289.
234. Id. at 290.
235. Id. at 290-91.
236. Id. at 291.
237. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 148, at 291.
238. Id. at 291-92. But see 1986 Hearings, supra note 114, at 692 (statement of the ITC
Trial Lawyers Association) (asserting that the fears of opening the floodgates of litigation,
caused by allowing foreign companies to appear before the ITC, are valid).
239. Wegner, supra note 181, at 80. Wegner also suggests that the majority of § 337 inves-
tigations involve low-technology goods. Id.
240. The statute would guarantee only expeditious preliminary relief, thus responding to
the GATT's criticism that the time limits on the entire proceeding are unfair to respondents.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
241. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 292-94. The authors would eliminate the forfei-
ture provisions from § 337 and award bonds to the successful party.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
SECTION 337 AND THE GATT
that sufficient safeguards exist to protect the importers' interests if no
violation is found.242 Moreover, the United States has a legitimate inter-
est in expeditious treatment of section 337 intellectual property cases,
because the remedies under section 337 are prospective and would be
largely useless without fast action.24 3 This proposal also meets the
GATT requirement of adequate safeguards for respondents because,
when permanent relief is found inappropriate, the bonds required of
complainant (in order to obtain temporary relief) and respondent (to
continue importing the articles) are paid to the injured party rather than
to the U.S. government. 244
Neeley and Ishida assert that amendments necessary to meet the
remaining GATT findings-the unavailability of counterclaims at the
ITC and the choice of fora available to complainants-would seriously
undermine section 337 relief or would make relief impossible. Allowing
counterclaims at the ITC would be disastrous because it would allow
respondents a greater remedy than complainants.2 45 A respondent could
get a judgment for monetary damages while complainants could receive
only prospective, nonmonetary relief. Neeley and Ishida argue that the
necessity rationale does justify differential treatment. They note that
GATT panels twice have upheld the use of exclusion orders. The panels
found the orders necessary to enforce intellectual property rights, despite
the fact that exclusion orders are limited to imports by definition. 246 Nee-
ley and Ishida believe that prohibiting the use of counterclaims is essen-
tial to the continued viability of the administrative remedy. The
prohibition, therefore, may be defended on the basis of necessity against
allowing counterclaims in the ITC.247
Finally, Neeley and Ishida suggest that the choice of fora available
to complainants (and denied to respondents) is necessary for expeditious
relief because constitutional separation of powers problems arise if Con-
gress attempts to put strict time limits on judicial proceedings. 248 They
ignore, however, the U.S. Trade Representative's suggestion that a sec-
tion 337 case may be handled in a two fora, bifurcated proceeding,
thereby preserving the strict time limits at the ITC and allowing greater
relief through the district courts.249
242. See 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 8, at 395.
243. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 292.
244. Id. at 293-94.
245. Id. at 295.
246. 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 8, at 394; Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at
295.
247. Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 295-96.
248. Id at 296. Again, Neeley and Ishida assert that without strict time limits expeditious
relief is impossible.
249. See infra Part IV.C.
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The Neeley and Ishida proposal limits itself to preserving section
337 as much as possible within the constraints of the GATT. It outlines
to what extent the current statute may be kept intact under arguments of
"necessity" pursuant to the GATT. The proposal ignores, however, the
potential political backlash that might occur if its first element were
adopted--opening section 337 to all U.S. intellectual property right-
holders, regardless of national origin. Most likely, an amendment that
allows disputes between two foreign companies to proceed in U.S. courts
or administrative agencies would not be passed by Congress. Such a fail-
ure is likely because recent legislative reform efforts emphasize strength-
ening the protective character of section 337, whereas allowing these
disputes would weaken the protection. 250 Equal treatment of importing
infringers and domestic infringers before the ITC, however, is a central
part of the GATT ruling. Any change to section 337 actions based upon
intellectual property claims must be premised on a clear policy of pro-
tecting U.S. intellectual property rights, regardless of the property
holder's nationality.
The Neeley and Ishida solution also ignores the significant problems
of litigating in two fora. 251 Attempts to reform section 337 should go
beyond merely eliminating its more discriminatory elements; Congress
also should try to improve the overall relief for complainants. 252 This
would include an attempt to address the problems caused by limiting
section 337 to prospective relief alone.253
(2) The International Trade Commission Trial Lawyers Association Proposal
The American Bar Association (ABA) and the International Trade
Commission Trial Lawyers Association (ITCTLA) are interested in a
less drastic remedy and have offered a different set of amendments. 25 4
These organizations suggest four amendments to section 337: (1) al-
lowing an alleged infringer to initiate a declaratory judgment action in
the ITC, under the appropriate circumstances;25 5 (2) allowing respon-
250. Foreign companies that manufacture their products abroad would be able to protect
or even increase their share of United States markets by using § 337. See Clark, supra note 1,
at 1153.
251. These include expense to complainants of conducting two separate trials to obtain
complete relief, see supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text; and preclusion problems, see
supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
252. Recent amendments to § 337 have added judicial-type safeguards to the administra-
tive proceeding. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341(a), 88 Stat. 1978, 2053
(1975); supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text. Addressing the conflicts cited by the 1988
GATT Panel Report would continue this trend and would significantly blur the distinction
between the two fora.
253. See infra notes 338-39 and accompanying text.
254. Trade Frictions, supra note 182, at 1274.
255. The proposal, however, does not attempt to define under what circumstances a de-
claratory judgment action would be "appropriate."
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dents to assert counterclaims before the ITC to defeat remedies available
to complainants; (3) eliminating time limits for permanent relief, while
encouraging the expeditious handling of cases; and (4) giving a respon-
dent to concurrent ITC and district court actions the right to stay the
district court proceeding relating to the same issues.256
These proposed amendments, however, are seriously flawed. Under
current rules, an ITC declaratory judgment on patent validity has no
collateral estoppel effect on the district courts,257 and the ITCTLA does
not suggest adding this feature. Thus, such a judgment in the ITC would
be of little value unless access to the district courts were denied entirely.
Moreover, these amendments ignore the hazards of allowing counter-
claims in the ITC without simultaneously allowing damages to a com-
plainant; a respondent might be able to obtain remedies of a type
foreclosed to ITC complainants. 258 In sum, the amendments offered by
the ABA and the ITCTLA are not a well-considered response to GATT
concerns. They do show, however, that experts recognize the need to
conform section 337 to U.S. obligations under the GATT.
(3) Japanese Model Proposal
Finally, one practitioner suggests that "there is nothing wrong, and
much potential benefit, to retaining [section] 337 as an enforcement
tool," 2 59 as in the Japanese model. In the Japanese system, the Customs
House has discretionary authority to block the importation of products
that Japanese courts have found infringe upon Japanese intellectual prop-
erty rights.260 Wegner asserts that the United States "would do well to
maintain [section] 337 for in rem enforcement against would-be import-
ers who seek to skirt the jurisdiction of the court with hit-and-run im-
ports of goods under various names. '261
This type of remedy would be much more limited than the current
section 337 and would not be exclusive of other section 337 reform.262 In
the United States, the proposal would eliminate the ITC proceeding alto-
gether, and any factual determinations would presumably be conducted
by U.S. Customs. Instead of an injury requirement, a U.S. patent holder
must meet the much higher burden of proving in court that the patent is
256. Trade Frictions, supra note 182, at 1274-75.
257. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 69, at 196.
258. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
259. Wegner, supra note 181, at 82.
260. 1d, at 83. An intellectual property owner may petition the Customs House to exclude
the infringing goods, but the Customs House has no legal obligation to respond. Moreover, in
Japan, the proceeding may be entirely exparte, giving the importer no opportunity to respond
other than a formal opposition or an attack in the courts. Id.
261. Id.
262. Wegner suggests that the option to transfer to district court will be the final straw in
the shift of focus away from § 337 in intellectual property cases. Id.
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valid. Once patent validity is proven, however, the remedy is more expe-
ditious than the current section 337.
This proposal has not yet sparked GATT criticism. However, a
prior judicial declaration of a patent's validity is not equivalent to a de-
termination that the import infringes the patent. Thus, to be fair to re-
spondent importers, the patent holder should be able to obtain a
determination on the infringement issue. This procedure presumably
would be accompanied by a fair hearing with respect to each product the
patent holder seeks to exclude. Thus, the Japanese model is only a more
simple and less costly version of section 337.
B. Legislative Reform Efforts
Recent legislative reform initiatives do not address section 337's al-
leged illegality under the GATT, nor do they reflect an awareness of the
problem. Instead the initiatives focus on strengthening the statute,
which indicates a protectionist trend in Congress.
(1) The Proposed "Intellectual Property Protection Act of 1989"
Despite increasing criticism of section 337's discriminatory charac-
ter, one recent reform effort suggests that section 337 should be used as a
political weapon against foreign trading partners. In August 1989, Sena-
tor Rockefeller introduced legislation that would amend section 337 to
put pressure on countries, like Japan, that deny adequate patent protec-
tion to U.S. nationals. 263 The Proposed 1989 Act would add a new sub-
section entitled "Identification of Foreign Countries," that would require
the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to "identify those foreign
countries whose 'unreasonable delays' in granting or enforcing patents or
'unnecessarily narrow interpretations' of patent claims effectively deny
adequate protection of the intellectual property of U.S. nationals."'264
The proposed amendment would make several significant changes to
a section 337 action involving products from an "identified" foreign
country. First, the ITC would eliminate its consideration of public wel-
fare and public policy factors when determining what is the appropriate
263. Intellectual Property Protection Act of 1989, S. 1529, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
[hereinafter Proposed 1989 Act]. "I am concerned that American and other foreign compa-
nies, especially those in high tech industries, do not receive adequate patent protection in Ja-
pan." 135 CONG. Ruc. S10268 (daily ed. August 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
Senator Rockefeller identified two defects in the Japanese patent system that he believes signifi-
cantly affect U.S. companies. First, he argues that the length of time it takes to obtain a patent
in Japan, an average of over five years, versus an average of nineteen months in the U.S., is "an
open invitation to copying and abuse." Id Second, he argues that the Japanese patent office
construes patent claims very narrowly, thereby permitting Japanese companies to make minor
changes to a patented invention and misappropriate technology. Id.
264. Proposed 1989 Act, supra note 263, § 3.
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exclusion order. 265 Second, the bill would limit available defenses in sec-
tion 337 actions to noninfringement alone, thereby eliminating the re-
spondent's ability to challenge the patent's validity.266 Third, the bill
would eliminate presidential policy review of ITC orders.267 Elimination
of this review should favor complainants because these provisions are
used to deny a proposed order that otherwise would be granted in favor
of a complainant. Finally, the bill would extend the exclusion order to
articles imported for the federal government. 268 The current section 337
exempts articles imported for use by the federal government from any
ITC exclusion order.269 Presumably, the effect of this amendment would
be to protect U.S. industry and labor by excluding more imports and
increasing the market share for competing domestic products.
The intent of these changes is obvious. They are designed to signifi-
cantly increase complainants' success rates before the ITC and signifi-
cantly decrease the ability of an importer to respond to a section 337
complaint. They appear to be more concerned with making section 337 a
"preemptive strike" remedy than an adjudication that balances compet-
ing policy interests. Such changes could only exacerbate the conflicts
with the GATT and increase international hostility. Thus, this is an un-
satisfactory proposal for reform.
(2) Proposed Mandatory Temporary Exclusion Order
A less sweeping effort to strengthen section 337 focuses on the need
for immediate relief from infringing imports. In May 1990, Representa-
tive Tom Campbell proposed a bill that would make temporary exclusion
orders mandatory rather than discretionary, if the basis of the claim was
an intellectual property right.270 This bill would require the ITC to issue
a temporary exclusion order upon determination that there is reason to
believe the imported goods are infringing upon a protected domestic
product. The proposal does not appear to alter the standard by which a
preliminary relief determination is made. It also retains the process
whereby the ITC considers the temporary exclusion order's effect on the
public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the U.S. economy,
the production of competitive articles in the United States, and U.S. con-
sumers.271 Representative Campbell noted, "Most firms prefer seeking
relief from 337 over filing a case in Federal Court; it offers a relatively
quick procedure for a final ruling and allows the ITC to exclude an of-
265. Id.
266. Id. § 4.
267. Id. § 5.
268. Id. § 6.
269. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(I) (1988).
270. H.R. 4710, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
271. Id.
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fending good during the consideration of a case."' 272 Representative
Campbell was concerned that the 1988 Amendments did not adequately
ensure temporary relief because they did not require relief until the pro-
ceedings were complete.273
This proposal is a minor modification that also makes no attempt to
address the GATT concerns. Like the Proposed 1989 Act, it merely il-
lustrates protectionist sentiment in Congress.
IV. The New Proposals of the United States Trade
Representative
This Part evaluates the five legislative initiatives proposed by the
U.S. Trade Representative to reconcile section 337 with the GATT. Sub-
part A discusses an option that would create a new trial level patent
court to try all section 337 proceedings. Subpart B evaluates an option
that also would transform section 337 proceedings into an exclusively
judicial cause of action, but would place the claims in a special division of
the Court of International Trade. Subpart C discusses two options, both
of which are bifurcated proceedings. These last two options allow sec-
tion 337 cases to be transferred to a district court either after the initial
determination of preliminary relief or after a determination of violation
has been made. This Part then critically evaluates these proposals and
recommends an option that would retain current ITC jurisdiction for
those litigants who choose the administrative forum, but would allow the
entire case to be transferred to a judicial forum at the respondent's
option.
The U.S. Trade Representative published five new proposals regard-
ing section 337 reform to "facilitate procedures, provide more compre-
hensive relief in a single action, and bring the U.S. into conformity with
its international obligations." 274 Although the proposals were issued
with the purpose of conforming section 337 to the 1988 GATT Panel
Report, they also were aimed at improving the effectiveness of the patent
system in general.27 5
272. 136 CONG. Rmc. E1333 (daily ed. May 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Campbell).
273. Id
274. USTR Proposes Changes, supra note 10, at 259. The new proposals were published in
the Federal Register on Feb. 1, 1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 3,503 (1990). The U.S. Trade Representa-
tive issued a paper concurrently with the proposals that further detailed the proposals. Possi-
ble Amendments to Procedures for Enforcement of Patent Rights, 39 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 967, at 271-78 (Feb. 8, 1990) [hereinafter Paper].
275. Paper, supra note 274, at 259. The U.S. Trade Representative suggests that the 1988
GATT Panel Report, together with the Uruguay Round negotiations on TRIPs, provides an
incentive and an opportunity to improve the system. She notes that an effective patent system
"should provide prompt relief against patent infringers, including damages sufficient to both
compensate patent owners and deter infringement." I'd at 272. Patent owners should be able
to block infringing activity on both a preliminary and permanent basis. Finally, an effective
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The new proposals are a laudatory attempt to incorporate the goals
of the U.S. proposal on TRIPs into section 337 reform. The judicial
claim and initial transfer options are significant changes that go beyond
merely conforming section 337 to the 1988 GATT Panel Report criti-
cisms. Unfortunately, however, the U.S. Trade Representative also in-
cludes bifurcated proceedings options that do little more than contort the
statute to meet GATT concerns, without addressing the underlying con-
cerns of the 1988 GATT Panel Report. These bifurcated proceeding op-
tions are designed to placate a protectionist Congress. By broadening the
goals of the reform effort, however, the U.S. Trade Representative may
be able to minimize the anticipated protectionist pressure.
A. Trial Level Patent Court
The first proposal would establish a specialized, trial level, Article
III court,276 which would be empowered to hear all patent related litiga-
tion, including patent-based section 337 complaints.277 The new court
would be able to grant the remedies currently available to the ITC in a
section 337 action, as well as Article III court remedies.278 Due to the
constraints of constitutional separation of powers, none of the orders
would be subject to presidential review. 279 This option ensures national
treatment of all litigants because all patent-based section 337 complaints
would be subject to the procedural rules applicable in Article III courts,
and because domestic infringers and importing infringers would be
treated identically.280 It preserves the at-border enforcement of the cur-
rent ITC system, allows collateral claims, and perhaps most importantly,
eliminates duplicative procedures for obtaining complete relief.28 1 The
U.S. Trade Representative believes that relief in a special patent court
would be expeditious despite the fact that no time limits can be placed on
an Article III court.2 82 She reasons that cases will be handled quickly
because the new court will be uncluttered by a criminal docket and addi-
tional judicial appointments might be made to expedite disposition of
patent system should provide for enforcement against foreign manufacturers and importers.
Id.
276. "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CONST., art. III, § 1.
277. Paper, supra note 274, at 271. The patent court would be the mandatory forum for
all § 337 complaints. This proposal would thus shift exclusive jurisdiction over patent-based
import matters from the ITC to the new patent court.
278. But see infra notes 296-98 and accompanying text.
279. Paper, supra note 274, at 274.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 275. A patentee need not bring suit after an ITC proceeding in order to obtain
monetary damages, and a respondent need not bring suit in a separate forum for counter-
claims. See supra notes 40-44, 54-56 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
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cases. 283 Moreover, preliminary relief is available as quickly in a district
court as before the ITC.284
The focus of this option is primarily on improving the overall en-
forcement of U.S. patent rights by granting complete relief and enhanced
enforcement remedies in one forum. 285 It is consistent with the 1982
decision to create a specialized appeals court, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), and also would serve the same pol-
icy goals: greater uniformity in the development and application of U.S.
patent law, more stability and predictability in the application of patent
law, the elimination of forum shopping, and the reduction of other
courts' workload.2 6 The U.S. Trade Representative asserts that the
same needs that prompted creation of the Federal Circuit exist at the
trial level in patent litigation.287 There has been praise for this option for
its "positive approach toward fixing the system of intellectual property
enforcement in the United States, as opposed to a defensive retooling of
the ITC system. '28 8 There are, however, many drawbacks to a unified
trial level patent court that make this solution more problematic than
helpful. These include jurisdictional problems and the loss of trade
expertise.
The U.S. Trade Representative recognizes that there may be major
opposition to a unified trial level patent court. These concerns include:
protecting against bias in favor of or against patentees, 289 maintaining the
prestige of appointments to the new court, and ensuring that the Federal
Circuit will provide a meaningful review. 290 One commentator suggests
that a patent-only court "would have the detriment of creating an iso-
lated group of judges and practitioners without interaction to the general
mix of cases in other areas of the law." 291 Moreover, the goals of greater
283. Paper, supra note 274, at 275.
284. New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at
710.
285. Paper, supra note 274, at 274.
286. Id. The U.S. Trade Representative notes that from June 1988 to June 1989, 1248
patent infringement actions were filed in district courts. Although only eight percent of those
cases go to trial, the median time for disposition is 31 months, longer than any other type of
civil action. The median time, however, varies with the circuit. Id. at 275. More importantly,
she also notes, "The time expended in obtaining a judgment can be a significant consideration
when a patent owner decides whether to attempt to enforce his rights." Id.
287. Ia at 274-75. Harold Wegner, a Washington, D.C. practitioner who has written a
response to the U.S. Trade Representative's proposals, suggests that "the U.S. trial level han-
dling of cases is urgently in need of reform." Wegner, supra note 181, at 81.
288. Wegner, supra note 181, at 81.
289. Overall bias in favor of or against patentees might arise from uniformity in decision-
making. If one court were to decide all patent matters, that court might develop a pro- or anti-
patentee stance. See Paper, supra note 274, at 275.
290. Id.
291. Wegner, supra note 181, at 81. This danger was avoided at the appellate level be-
cause only a minority of the Federal Circuit's cases involve patents. Id. For a thorough treat-
[Vol. 43
SECTION 337 AND THE GATT
uniformity and precision in U.S. patent law largely have been met by the
Federal Circuit,292 leaving only the problems of court congestion and
technical expertise at the trial level. Some commentators suggest that the
problems of congestion and lack of expertise are not unique to patent
litigation and that the district courts have developed techniques to deal
with them.293 The patent court option also does not address problems
arising from placing one set of section 337 cases-those based on statu-
tory patent rights-in a primarily patent oriented forum, and all other
section 337 cases-for example, statutory trademark and copyright
cases-in a primarily trade oriented forum. Although section 337 indi-
cates they are to be treated alike, a case based on patent infringement
might be treated very differently from a case based on trademark or
copyright infringement merely because they are tried in separate forums.
Finally, a trial level patent court also may place tremendous burdens on
litigants who will have to sue in one geographic forum.
One of the ITC's advantages is that a complainant need not prove
personal jurisdiction. 294 Usually, an action for patent infringement in
district court is based on in personam jurisdiction. 295 A new patent court
could extend jurisdiction to issue limited and general exclusion orders if a
defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the United States.2 96
Whether this test is likely to cover any manufacturer whose products
ultimately will be sold in the United States, however, is unclear. 297 Thus,
ment on the successes and failures of the Federal Circuit to date, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1989).
Dreyfuss notes that the dangers of the court's tunnel vision were explicitly recognized by Con-
gress. Thus, Congress supplemented the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction with authority over di-
verse areas. Id at 3-4. The New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association
notes that when the Federal Circuit was created, "[a] rotation of judges from panel to panel
was required in order to avoid the development of a special division to deal with any of its
areas ofjurisdiction." New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra
note 123, at 713.
292. Dreyfuss, supra note 291, at 74.
293. New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at
713-14. These authors note that medical malpractice, environmental actions, and even crimi-
nal cases may include similarly complicated technical issues. The courts have used technical
law clerks, appointed masters, and neutral experts for assistance. Moreover, the authors argue
that technical expertise should not be elevated over judicial competence. Id. at 714.
294. "If the Commission determines ... that there is a violation of this section, it shall
direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person ... be excluded from entry into the
United States .... " 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
295. New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at
705. The authors note the possibility of actions against a class of defendants under FED. R.
Civ. P. 23. Id. at 705-06. This might allow a judgment against absent class members, but
complainants would have serious problems satisfying Rule 23's adequate representation and
notice requirements.
296. Paper, supra note 274, at 274 (essentially a nationwide long-arm statute).
297. See 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR P. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1067.1, at 311 (2d ed. 1987) (national minimum contacts analysis generally applies
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this option may restrict the number of potential respondents to a section
337 action by excluding some manufacturers. In fact, this possibility was
cited by the 1983 GATT Panel Report in support of its finding that dis-
trict court relief may be inadequate to protect complainants' rights.298
There also are concerns that an Article III court might not have the
power to issue general exclusion orders because such orders affect non-
parties. 299 First, it is possible that a general exclusion order "might be
held... an advisory opinion not directed to a 'case or controversy,' and
therefore constitutionally outside the scope of an Article III court's juris-
diction."' 3°° Second, general exclusion orders may extend to the property
of an importer whose goods are not involved in the action.301 The U.S.
Trade Representative responds:
For importers... who are not parties to the underlying action and do
not receive notice of it, a general exclusion order... would provide for
a post-exclusion hearing on the merits. Goods would be detained at
the border while the alleged infringer contested the case (including the
validity and infringement of the patent).30 2
Requiring the patent owner to relitigate these issues in a postexclusion
hearing, however, may place an even greater burden on a section 337
complainant than currently exists. Although the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive asserts that this "burden could diminish since there are a limited
number of issues related to validity that could be raised, ' 303 her assertion
does not address the issue adequately. In the interest of due process,
Article III courts are more likely to grant the respondent wide latitude in
raising issues in a postexclusion hearing. Such a procedure could result
in cases in which federal statute authorizes nationwide or worldwide service of process); Asahi
Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (four justices denied state court
jurisdiction over foreign corporation, requiring conduct other than merely placing a product in
the stream of commerce that indicates intent or purpose to serve the state's market); id. at 116-
17 (Brennan, J., concurring) (four justices found sufficient minimum contacts with the state
but denied jurisdiction for reasons of "fair play and substantial justice"); see also 4 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra, § 1069, at 363 (noting that a subsidiary's business within a forum does not
automatically subject the parent corporation to personal jurisdiction in that forum). A full
discussion of the parameters of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations is beyond the
scope of this Note.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
299. New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at
709.
300. New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at
712. The authors note two possible solutions to this problem: One is based upon provisions of
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 2320, permitting "John Doe" exparte
seizures of trademark counterfeits; the other is FED. R. Civ. P. 23, which permits actions
against a class of defendants. Id.
301. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
302. Paper, supra note 274, at 274.
303. lId at 275.
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in a full-scale relitigation of the section 337 complaint rather than a hear-
ing upon a few validity issues.304
Another serious drawback to the patent court option is the loss of
the ITC's trade expertise. The U.S. Trade Representative presumably
would rely upon court appointed experts or judges with trade back-
grounds.305 But this point begs the question of whether it is wise to try
essentially international trade cases in a forum that primarily deals with
patent matters. The U.S. Trade Representative also is unsure if the pub-
lic interest considerations now undertaken by the ITC should be under-
taken by the new forum. Placing section 337 actions in a patent court
emphasizes the policy of protecting intellectual property rights rather
than protecting U.S. industries. This shift in emphasis is likely to be a
large political stumbling block in Congress.306 Section 337 always has
been a trade law rather than a purely intellectual property law. Because
section 337 deals with international commerce, considerations of interna-
tional relations have always played a part in its remedies.30 7 If the public
interest concerns are explicitly removed, and the ITC's trade expertise
effectively removed from section 337 cases, the United States must be
prepared to deal with possible negative effects on U.S. consumers or U.S.
industry.
Another practitioner suggests that the primary impediment to the
patent court solution is that it would be "inconceivable that a patent trial
court could be created smoothly in a short amount of time." 308 This
disruption to the judicial system "must be weighed against other judicial
priorities in terms of dealing with the civil and criminal dockets of the
federal courts. o30 9 He proposes that before considering the extreme op-
tion of a patent trial court, the U.S. Trade Representative should con-
sider less radical proposals based on the European patent system.310
Wegner suggests that it would be "easy" for the United States to vest
304. The possibility of intervention by nonparty importers under FED. R. Civ. P. 24 may
ease this problem. A potential intervenor, however, may not have sufficient incentive to join
the suit because she may not be precluded from relitigating the patent validity issues and she
may prefer a postexclusion hearing over a full-scale U.S. patent infringement suit.
305. See Paper, supra note 274, at 275.
306. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
308. Wegner, supra note 181, at 81. These concerns are reiterated by the New York Pat-
ent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at 713-14. Moreover, even
in the Federal Circuit there is still a "muddle on the administrative side. Jurisdictional lines
remain confused and the court's positions on supervisory and choice of law matters are not
entirely workable." Dreyfuss, supra note 291, at 52. While Dreyfuss notes that these problems
may be transitional, they continue to be a problem nine years after the court's creation.
309. Wegner, supra note 181, at 81-82.
310. Id. Wegner discusses two models. The German system handles patent infringement
in only a handful of its many district courts. The Luxembourg solution, proposed for the
European Community in 1975, adopts the German system. Id.
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exclusive trial jurisdiction in one district court within each federal cir-
cuit. 311 This would have the advantage of creating a substantial patent
docket in that court, with a concomitant increase in patent expertise in a
short amount of time.312 In the interest of judicial efficiency, each circuit
also would be free to shift the patent court's location, or add a second
district court if the patent docket becomes too heavy. 313
For section 337 cases, however, Wegner's proposal magnifies con-
cerns about the lack of public interest considerations and the lack of
trade expertise in fashioning section 337 remedies. Instead of having a
single body with trade expertise determining what is in the "public inter-
est," there would be eleven bodies with little or no trade expertise, and a
concomitant decrease in consistency. Because international relations
may be affected by these decisions, consistency of decisionmaking is vital.
A number of commentators have rejected the trial level patent court
proposal as being "too radical," in that it requires such drastic changes
to the current system.314 An effective amendment to section 337 must
focus on preserving the use of trade expertise and the retention of public
interest factors in order to be responsive to the needs of international
commerce. The trial level patent court option also ignores the potential
advantages of an administrative forum to respondents: the ITC's lack of
authority to award damages or attorney fees; the nonjury procedure; the
possibility of both an appeal and presidential review; and the opportunity
to avoid full scale U.S. patent litigation. 315 While the patent court option
ultimately provides the national treatment with which the GATT is con-
cerned, the GATT does not require the elimination of the administrative
forum altogether. The United States should be concerned with preserv-
ing flexibility if it seriously wishes to formulate an integrated intellectual
property agreement within the GATT. Ideally, a comprehensive intellec-
tual property code within the GATT would eliminate the need for sec-
tion 337. Before adopting such a drastic solution, however, the rationale
for adopting a trial level patent court should be much stronger, and the
need more persuasive than an impetus to conform section 337 with U.S.
obligations under the GATT.
311. Id. at 82.
312. Id. Wegner notes that this has occurred in the German patent system, which has
limited the number of courts that have patent jurisdiction. These courts have enjoyed a "repu-
tation as one of the finest trial-level patent courts in the world." lia at 81.
313. Id. at 82.
314. Administration Will Look to Uruguay Round in Deciding on Changes in Patent En-
forcement, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 793 (June 6, 1990) [hereinafter Changes In
Patent Enforcement] (statement of Yale Law Professor Harold Koh); see also New York Pat-
ent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at 715; Wegner, supra note
181, at 81.
315. New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at
708.
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B. The Court of International Trade
The second option proposed by the U.S. Trade Representative in-
volves the Court of International Trade (CIT).316 This option would cre-
ate a specialized division of the CIT to hear patent infringement cases
involving imports, including counterclaims that the district courts may
hear currently.317 Like the trial level patent court, the new CIT division
would have the authority to grant all remedies available to the ITC in
section 337 cases, as well as all Article III court remedies. To maintain
continuity and uniformity, appeals would be to the Federal Circuit.318
To avoid preclusion problems, this option would include rules allowing
consolidation of actions filed in the district courts, which also would en-
courage dispute resolution in a single proceeding. 31 9 Consolidation
would favor the section 337 forum because of the CIT's trade exper-
tise.320 This option involves many of the same benefits as the patent
court option: a single proceeding for complete relief, and equal treat-
ment to claimants and respondents. 321 It also would require fewer judi-
cial appointments. 322
The CIT option, however, does not address the choice of fora prob-
lem cited in the 1988 GATT Panel Report because complainants remain
free to choose the district courts. This option transforms section 337 into
a judicial claim while keeping it in a trade related forum. It is a weak
substitute for the trial level patent court option because it does not im-
prove the U.S. patent system, and it is subject to many of the same
problems as the trial level patent court. Most importantly, the CIT is
primarily responsible for overseeing the administration of the trade laws
by U.S. agencies, and "does not resolve disputes between private
parties. '323
316. The Court of International Trade is an Article III court that was created in 1980 to
review a wide variety of administrative actions with respect to U.S. trade laws. For an over-
view of the history and functions of the CIT, see Tucker, The United States Court of Interna-
tional Trade: Will It Ever Be Understood?, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 225 (1989).
317. Paper, supra note 274, at 275.
318. Id Currently, ITC decisions are appealable to the Federal Circuit, Investigations of
Unfair Practices in Import Trade, 19 C.F.R. § 210.71 (1991), as are district court patent ac-
tions, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1988); Dreyfuss, supra note 291, at 3-4.
319. Paper, supra note 274, at 275-77.
320. Id
321. Foreign and domestic infringers would be treated similarly because both would be
subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even though they are not subject to suit in the
same forum.
322. Paper, supra note 274, at 276. The U.S. Trade Representative notes that the new
division could sit in Washington, with ready access to the ITC and the Fcderal Circuit. Id. at
275.
323. Tucker, supra note 316, at 228.
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C. Transfer Options
There are two types of transfer options. Section 1 discusses two op-
tions for bifurcated proceedings and section 2 evaluates and recommends
a third proposal that would allow a respondent to transfer a section 337
case to an Article III court at the initial stage of the proceeding.
(1) Bifurcated Proceedings
There are two proposals that provide for litigation in both adminis-
trative and judicial fora in most cases. These proposals would allow
transfer of a section 337 case to a district court, at the respondent's re-
quest. The timing and number of issues that could be litigated in the
transfer forum, however, would be limited.324
In the first option, the case could be transferred by a respondent
after the ITC preliminary relief hearing. This procedure would enable a
complainant to keep the benefit of the statutory time limits and allow her
to seek a complete remedy, including damages, 'n an Article III court.325
This procedure would be limited by waiver rules whereby a respondent
electing to remain in the administrative forum would be bound by the
ITC's determination on patent validity and infringement.326 This option,
however, has been called "a waste of judicial resources" because the ITC
and the court would need to deal with the same substantive issues.32 7 In
determining whether preliminary relief should be granted, the ITC must
consider the likelihood of success, which includes the examination of
both validity and infringement issues.328 A court receiving a transferred
case after preliminary relief must finally adjudicate those same issues.
The second, more limited variation, involves transferring the case at
the conclusion of what is now the violation portion of the ITC proceed-
ing.329 If the ITC found a violation of section 337 at the end of its inves-
tigation, it would enter an order that could be modified by the court
either on transfer or at the conclusion of the judicial portion of that
case.330 Either party could then request a transfer to a federal court for a
determination of Article III court claims, which include counterclaims
and damages issues.331 Again, this raises the possibility that both fora
may consider the same issues.
324. Paper, supra note 274, at 277.
325. Id. Preliminary relief, however, is available as rapidly from a district court as from
the ITC. See supra text accompanying note 284.
326. See infra note 345 and accompanying text.
327. Wegner, supra note 181, at 82.
328. Investigations of Unfair Practices in Import Trade, 19 C.F.R. § 210.24(e)(1)(i)(A)
(1991).
329. Paper, supra note 274, at 278. This includes the entire current § 337 proceeding ex-
cept for presidential review.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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Bifurcated proceedings preserve the section 337 remedy as much as
possible, while attempting to address the GATT concerns. 332 They pre-
serve expeditious relief and presidential review if recourse to the courts is
not sought. Although bifurcated proceedings appear to follow the letter
of the 1988 GATT Panel Report, they seem to ignore its spirit.333 One
commentator argues, "The evils of the ITC procedure reside in the initial
lightning determinations of infringement and validity and the gross in-
conveniences and expenses to respondents." 334 The 1988 GATT Panel
Report discusses in particular the various "tactical disadvantages" of the
ITC procedure for respondents.335 Bifurcated proceedings will continue
to allow these disadvantages. Ultimately, the "equal treatment" pro-
vided by the bifurcated proceedings options is merely an attempt to
equalize the results obtained by domestic and importing infringers, with-
out addressing the disparity in procedural treatment.
(2) The Initial Transfer Option
The initial transfer option would allow transfer of a section 337 case
in its entirety, at the request of a respondent, to either a district court or
to a special division of the CIT.336 This procedure neutralizes complain-
ants' advantage in choosing a forum that has extreme disadvantages for
respondents.337 The complainant must be careful to name all known
manufacturers or importers that might be subject to the action, because
any of the respondents could request a transfer of the case and allege
counterclaims. 338 Once transferred, the complainant also could amend
her complaint to include other claims and request damages or other Arti-
cle III court remedies, in addition to all of the section 337 remedies avail-
able in the ITC.339
332. Both options specify the issuance of bonds as safeguards. The bond required of a
respondent to continue importing could be applied to any damages awarded by the court. Id.
Furthermore, as in the current procedure, bonds could be required of complainants as a pre-
requisite for preliminary relief, see supra text accompanying notes 47-49, and then could be
awarded to a successful respondent.
333. There are some issues in the 1988 GATT Panel Report that these options do not
address; for example, the finding that the necessity clause may justify fixed time limits on the
preliminary determination, but not on disposition of the violation portion of the case.
334. Wegner, supra note 181, at 82.
335. See Neeley & Ishida, supra note 151, at 295 (interpreting the 1988 GATT panel re-
port with respect to counterclaims).
336. Paper, supra note 274, at 276. As noted above, however, the transfer should be to a
district court rather than the CIT because of the CIT's inexperience with patent matters and
private disputes. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
337. See infra notes 339, 343 and accompanying text.
338. Paper, supra note 274, at 276.
339. Id. An unnamed respondent would not be bound by any judicial award of damages
because she has not submitted to the court's personal jurisdiction.
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Upon transfer, the case proceeds as if it initially was brought in a
judicial forum. This option addresses the GATT's concerns with choice
of fora because any advantage initially available to a complainant is ne-
gated by a respondent's right to move the action into federal court.340
This option also does not impose the use of a judicial forum when it may
not be necessary or desirable, as for example, in default actions.3 41 De-
fault actions are more efficiently disposed of in the administrative forum.
Because ITC respondents are subject to so many tactical disadvantages,
most respondents with arguable defenses or counterclaims probably will
elect to transfer. Other respondents could choose between joining the
transferred proceeding or remaining before the ITC.342 The U.S. Trade
Representative deals with the problem of requiring the complainant to
litigate in two fora by suggesting that she could transfer the entire case to
the district court when one of the respondents requests a transfer.343
Thus, the initial transfer option fully addresses the GATT concerns that
the respondent will be disadvantaged by the ITC's short and fixed time
limits or by the unavailability of counterclaims at the ITC. A respondent
easily can avoid both problems. Nor is a complainant disadvantaged
with respect to preliminary relief because preliminary relief is available as
quickly in a district court as in the ITC.344
By providing waiver rules when the proceeding remains before the
ITC, the initial transfer option also addresses GATT concerns that re-
spondents may be required to relitigate in a district court. Under the
waiver rules, a respondent electing to remain before the ITC would be
bound by any ITC decision on patent validity and infringement. 345
Therefore, a successful ITC complainant could litigate only damages is-
sues in a later district court proceeding. Likewise, an unsuccessful com-
plainant would be precluded from seeking a ruling on patent validity or
infringement in the district courts.
The primary advantage of these waiver rules is that they allow a
complainant complete relief in the district courts without the need for a
de novo hearing on matters already tried before the ITC. Moreover, a
340. New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at
716-17.
341. Paper, supra note 274, at 277.
342. Id.
343. Id at 276-77. Accordingly, a complainant may indirectly force a respondent into a
judicial forum. This can only occur when there are multiple respondents, and one elects to
transfer. The respondent forced into court may be able to pool her resources with other re-
spondents. The unwilling respondent already may be allied with other respondents in the same
action, either because they import the same article, or because together they form a chain of
production for the article, as in a manufacturer-dealer, or distributor-retailer relationship.
344. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
345. Id This is a major shift from current ITC proceedings, in which determinations of
patent validity and infringement do not have collateral estoppel effect in the district courts.
1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 69, at 196.
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respondent successful in the ITC would be assured that she need not
relitigate in any forum or that she could bring counterclaims in a district
court, again without the need for a de novo hearing. The patent holder
who selects the ITC forum and then loses her case thus risks loss of
access to the district courts if the respondent elects not to transfer. This
is, however, a part of the fora selection decision. Finally, unlike the trial
patent court, the initial transfer option ensures that section 337 claims
based on different intellectual property rights-patent infringement,
trademark infringement, or copyright infringement-would receive simi-
lar treatment, all being dealt with in the same forum.
The initial transfer option is not without its problems. The rules
required for its operation become complex when some respondents elect
to remain at the ITC and others choose to transfer (and the complainant
has not forced transfer of the entire case), because of the different speeds
of the respective proceedings. 346 The problem, however, is not insur-
mountable. The U.S. Trade Representative suggests that, if the ITC is-
sues an order prior to a judicial decision, that order should not be
effective against parties to the judicial proceeding.347 If the court reaches
a different decision on patent validity or infringement issues, however,
the court's decision would be binding on the ITC and would require
modification of the ITC order.348 While this has the potential for upset-
ting ITC orders, it does ensure that a judicial decision on patent validity
and infringement will take precedence. 349
In this same context, it also is unclear what the effect would be if
both the ITC and the district court found an infringement of a valid
right, and the ITC order were denied by the President for policy rea-
sons-a judicial decision is not subject to the same review. The result
would be inconsistent dispositions arising from identical rulings on in-
fringement and validity issues.350 If public interest factors remain a part
of the court's analysis in a transferred section 337 case, however, differ-
ent results should not occur often, and presidential disapproval of section
337 orders should be infrequent. 351 It is likely that these split cases will
346. The ITC proceeding is subject to strict time limits, whereas no such limits can be
imposed on the district courts. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
347. Paper, supra note 274, at 276.
348. Id
349. In this context, it is important to remember the distinction between district court and
ITC decisions on validity and enforceability. The ITC only considers defenses of invalidity
and unenforceability for the purpose of exclusionary relief, whereas the district courts deter-
mine whether the right is valid and enforceable. Harvey Kaye, et al., The Jurisdictional Para-
digm Between the United States International Trade Commission and the Federal District
Courts, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 118, 119-22 (1982).
350. Giving the district court the final say on validity and enforceability of the right will
not solve this problem because the two tribunals have not disagreed on those issues.
351. See supra note 142. District court priority on validity and infringement issues also
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be extremely rare, particularly in light of the choice given to a complain-
ant to transfer the entire case once a respondent has elected to transfer.
The U.S. Trade Representative suggests that Congress might elimi-
nate the public interest considerations from the court's review and that
the potential for different results arising from this change might en-
courage some respondents to choose the ITC forum.352 In making this
suggestion, however, she ignores the fact that this potential for different
results might invite discrimination charges from the international com-
munity. In addition, it removes a possible advantage to respondents be-
cause the public interest factors usually will work to defeat a
complainant's claim for relief. Section 337's public interest factors essen-
tially operate to preclude relief only when the ITC has decided to grant a
complainant temporary or permanent relief. 353 Although this is not a
major issue because most respondents will elect to transfer, public inter-
est factors should remain in section 337 cases to encourage uniformity of
application.
The initial transfer option represents the best balance between com-
peting policy objectives. The issue of section 337 reform has been framed
as a balance between three competing objectives: "(1) the protection of
American intellectual property rights; (2) complying with international
treaty obligations; and (3) maintaining a uniform system of civil proce-
dure. ' 354 Section 337 additionally balances conflicting domestic policies
of intellectual property protection and the protection of domestic labor
and industry. The initial transfer option fully addresses the 1988 GATT
Panel Report's discrimination charges that could not be justified under
the necessity clause. Moreover, this option, particularly its waiver rules,
are an improvement over the current system of dual litigation in both an
administrative and judicial fora.355
There are critics, however, who charge that none of the solutions
proposed by the U.S. Trade Representative is acceptable. 356 Nonethe-
less, the United States can no longer drag its feet in responding to the
1988 GATT Panel Report. Because it is unlikely that a sufficiently com-
plete GATT solution will emerge from the Uruguay Round, it is essential
addresses concerns that ITC decisions might create patent-related precedent that is inconsis-
tent with the district courts. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
352. Paper, supra note 274, at 276.
353. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(f) (1988).
354. Changes in Patent Enforcement, supra note 314, at 792-93 (statement of Yale Law
Professor Harold Koh).
355. For a comprehensive discussion of dual path litigation in the ITC and the district
courts, see Ritscher et al., supra note 63; Keith J. Merritt, Comment, Res Judicata Effects and
Nonpatent Determinations Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 533 (1990); Kaye et al., supra note 349, at 118-37.
356. New York Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Association, supra note 123, at
718. "We recommend further study and discussion before a legislative response to the GATT
Report criticism is selected." Id.
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that Congress make a good faith effort to comply with the 1988 GATT
Panel Report to avoid potentially serious international retaliation. 357
The United States also has alternative, albeit more drastic, means to pres-
sure foreign trading partners into strengthening their intellectual prop-
erty protection, most notably section 301.358 These alternatives should
temper protectionist sentiment in Congress. Furthermore, Congress
could adopt an at-border proceeding under the administration of the U.S.
Customs Service that approximates the Japanese model for excluding im-
ported products that infringe an already litigated intellectual property
right. Therefore, the proposed initial transfer option strikes a balance
with respect to strengthening intellectual property rights, without elimi-
nating the protectionist underpinnings which Congress believes are nec-
essary deterrents.
V. Conclusion
The initial transfer option proposed by the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive is the best balance for both complainants and respondents in a sec-
tion 337 action. Although the U.S. intellectual property holder loses
many of her tactical advantages, she may also obtain complete relief in
one forum. If the section 337 case remains before the ITC, the right-
holder obtains the benefit of an expedited proceeding plus the opportu-
nity to obtain damages in a later district court action, without the need
for a de novo hearing on validity and infringement issues. Upon transfer,
the right-holder can obtain complete relief in one proceeding. The re-
spondent also may choose access to full judicial safeguards, or an expe-
dited proceeding before the ITC.
The need for section 337's reform has become more urgent because
of the tension generated by the recent collapse of the Uruguay Round of
the GATT negotiations, and the unlikelihood of an acceptable alternative
to section 337 within the GATT itself. The United States can no longer
rely on an imminent GATT-wide intellectual property agreement to jus-
tify delay in reforming the statute; it must respond to the criticisms of the
1988 GATT Panel Report. In addition, domestic political pressure to
keep section 337 as a protectionist trade remedy may be met by the adop-
tion of an exclusionary proceeding along the lines of the Japanese
model-expedited procedures for the automatic exclusion of imports that
have already been found to infringe intellectual property rights in the
U.S. courts. Finally, the initial transfer option allows Congress to main-
tain some balance between the policies of protecting intellectual property
rights, domestic industry, and labor, while preserving the flexibility to
357. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text. The situation likely will be exacer-
bated by the tension surrounding the collapse of the recent Uruguay Round.
358. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
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further reform or eliminate section 337 once an acceptable GATT-wide
intellectual property code is adopted.
